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शनिवार, 23 अप्रैल 2022

THE HINDU EDITORIAL - APRIL 5, 2022

 

THE HINDU EDITORIAL – APRIL 5, 2022

 

 Game for the throne

Imran Khan’s moves to cling to power betray his contempt for parliamentary procedures

It was certain that Imran Khan, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, would be ousted in the no-trust vote. The Opposition had put up a united face. His allies had jumped ship, reducing the ruling coalition to a minority. His party lawmakers had revolted against him. The cricketer turned-PM’s defeat was a matter of formality in a country where no Prime Minister has completed their term. On Sunday, the Deputy Speaker dismissed the no-trust motion, calling it against the Constitution, which was followed by Mr. Khan’s formal request to the President to dissolve the National Assembly. Pakistan will have to hold elections in three months, provided there is no judicial intervention. There were three bad options before Mr. Khan: resignation, no-trust vote or early elections. By choosing elections, he avoided a humiliating defeat and also sought to torpedo the Opposition’s bid to form a government for the remainder of the current Parliament’s term. Before the National Assembly convened, Mr. Khan had set the campaign pitch by accusing the Opposition of conspiring with a foreign power (an indirect reference to the U.S.) to unseat him. The current crisis would also allow him to play the victim of some foreign conspiracy and seek a fresh mandate. But the question is what price does Pakistan pay for his political manoeuvring? The conspiracy theories, the dismissal of the no-trust motion and the call for early elections all suggest Mr. Khan’s contempt for parliamentary procedures and basic democratic decency.

   For the labyrinth he is in today, Mr. Khan has to blame nobody but himself. Having been a political underdog for years, he broke into Pakistan’s two-party political order in 2018 with the direct support of the military. His cocktail of religious conservatism, nationalism and anti-corruption crusade promised to build a ‘Naya Pakistan’. But while in power, he made three critical mistakes: mismanagement of the economy, mismanagement of his ties with the military and full-spectrum hostility with the Opposition. His vindictive approach towards the Opposition brought together all the major Opposition parties, which tried to cash in on the growing public resentment amid economic woes. Cracks in the government’s relationship with the military began appearing last year when Mr. Khan reportedly sparred with the establishment over the appointment of the new ISI chief. His visit to Moscow in February, immediately after Russia’s Ukraine invasion and the “neutral” policy his government adopted regarding the conflict seem to have quickened his fall. Last week, the Army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, spoke against the Russian invasion and re-emphasized the importance of Pakistan’s ties with the U.S. in a public rebuke of Mr. Khan’s pragmatism. Now, out of favour with the military, a lost majority in Parliament and faced with anger amid a worsening economic crisis, the ‘Captain’ does not have any good options before him. With his back against the wall, what he is doing for political survival is only weakening Pakistan’s non-military institutions and subverting its democratic proceedings.

 

A pause to reflect

The Government, Bharat Biotech should strive for better communication on vaccine safety

The World Health Organization’s (WHO) decision to recommend a pause in the supply of Covaxin for export is worrying. This follows an inspection of the company’s production facilities between March 14 and 22 that found “deficiencies” in the process to ensure that the vaccine produced is consistently suitable for use. Bharat Biotech, the makers of Covaxin, has said it is committed to addressing these ‘Good Manufacturing Process deficiencies’ and developing a “corrective and preventive” action plan that it will submit to the Drugs Controller General of India (DCGI). WHOO has told countries that for now they should “consider” alternative vaccines but it has also said that the data available with it suggest that Covaxin is safe and effective. The details of these lacunae are not public but Bharat Biotech has said that sophisticated equipment needed to “enhance the process stringency” were unavailable during the COVID-19 pandemic. This is not the first time that Bharat Biotech has tangled with WHO. The global body sought information at least nine times from the Hyderabad company before approving it to be a global supplier of Covaxin. In March 2021, the Brazilian health regulator, Anvisa, pointed to several problems with Bharat Biotech’s manufacturing plant ahead of an agreement by the company to sell 20 million doses of the vaccine to Brazil. This deal was ultimately terminated, but there has never been clear communication either by Bharat Biotech or the DCGI on the concerns raised by the Brazilian health body.

   While India is no stranger to making and supplying billions of vaccine doses, it has historically done so with the benefit of time. The pandemic saw pulling out all the stops and the balance between safety and speed tilting towards the latter by both drug regulators, under pressure from their governments, and vaccine manufacturers, for whom gargantuan demand promised a financial windfall. Other companies, internationally too, have made mistakes in supply. AstraZeneca mistakenly supplied some volunteers who were being tested with the Oxford vaccine with half the required dose that led to surprising results. This was not disclosed until much after the trial results were made public and experts openly questioned the efficacy results. The defining characteristic of a vaccine is its safety profile and its acceptability is premised on its makers and the regulators being transparent about it at all times. Both the Government and Bharat Biotech should strive for better public communication on these fronts.

 

The road to Ukraine peace runs through Delhi

Mediation is certainly feasible and India is well positioned to act as a ‘Vishwa-Guru’ between Russia and the West

UTKARSH LEO & FAIZAN MUSTAFA

Nearly 40 days ago, Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in violation of international law and its security assurances under the Budapest Memorandum, 1994. And, there are no winners in sight. Despite peace talks held on March 29, in Istanbul (Turkey), direct negotiations between the conflicting parties have failed to make much progress: a ceasefire is yet to be achieved, and the Russian attacks on the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine continue. As a result, there have been 3,455 civilian casualties recorded in Ukraine (1,417 killed and 2,038 injured) while more than four million people have fled seeking protection, safety and assistance.

   Similarly, in addition to causalities on the Russian side, financial and economic sanctions imposed by the European Union and the G7 have impacted the Russian economy. Despite artificial measures to prop up the rouble, the economy is tanking, annual inflation has jumped to 15.6%, the Russian Central Bank’s forex reserves remain frozen and it cannot access financing and loans from multilateral institutions. At the global level, this war is disrupting supply chins and is causing the fuel and food prices to surge. This begs the question – if this unnecessary war has resulted in a no-win situation, why have negotiations failed to end it?

Positions versus interests

Past negotiations, by video conferencing or as peace talks (held in Belarus and Turkey) have failed to make much progress because the parties have been negotiating over ‘positions’ rather than ‘interests’. A ‘position’ is a surface statement of what a party wants; for example, Russia’s demand that Ukraine recognizes the separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states. Whereas, ‘interests’ are the underlying reasons behind those position; for instance, why is Russia focused on the independence of these separatist areas? Therefore, mediation as a conflicts resolution tool can assist the parties in identifying these hidden ‘interests’ and facilitate them in working towards crafting a solution that each of the parties would value – a Europe of common security and prosperity where the sovereignty of all nations (Ukraine, Russia and the West) are guaranteed.

   Mediation (or assisted negotiation) is a flexible conflict resolution tool facilitated by a neutral third party. Depending on the choice of parties, it can be facilitative or evaluative and can be conducted in joint sessions or caucuses (i.e., private meetings). Additionally, its focus on collaborative bargaining producing a win-win outcome (in contrast to adversarial proceedings such as arbitration or litigation that result in a win-loss outcome) equips it to handle conflicts of all kinds: from workplace disputes to broken contracts to international conflicts. International mediation follows this process of “assisting two or more contending parties to find a solution without resorting to force”. Due to its immense potential, the Charter of the United Nations under Article 33 recognises the promise of international mediation for peaceful resolution of international disputes.

Brokering peace

Throughout history, individuals, countries and organizations (such as the International Committee of the Red Cross) have acted as third parties and have brokered peace between conflicting nations. Described by theorists as a form of power brokerage or a political problem solving process, international mediation has been used to resolve conflicts for hundreds of years. The best known example is of U.S. President Jimmy Carter who mediated peace between Israel and Egypt (known as the Camp David Accords of 1978) that has resulted in 44 years of peace.

   Scholarship on neuroscience proves that emotions have a significant influence on cognitive processes (Kragel and LaBar 2016). If emotions are running high between conflicting parties it is very likely that either or both parties get re-active (i.e., to act without thinking). Ambrose Bierce wrote: “speak when you are angry and you will make the best speech you will ever regret’. This is where a neutral third party can act as a ;go-between’ (termed: shuttle diplomacy) to gather more information and help the parties identify their hidden interests. This helps in ensuring that conflicting parties keep their eyes on the prize. More importantly, the mediator shutting between parties helps in limiting or reducing re-active devaluation – a cognitive barrier where the disputants wrongfully construe the conflict as a zero sum game. As a result, even the value of a genuine offer coming directly from an adversary is automatically reduced in the eyes of the receiver. Therefore, subject to context and the consent of parties, the mediator can either play a passive role to facilitate communication or a more active role and exert more influence on the content of the discussion and the final solution.

Focusing on the priority

Certainly, international mediation has a lot to offer. But is it the right choice in the Russia-Ukraine conflict?

   Despite bilateral peace talks Russian air strikes continue on Ukrainian cities resulting in civilian casualties. The voice against dictatorships will want to hold the Russian President Vladimir Putin guilty of violation the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols. It may appear that opting for mediation legitimizes past violations of international law and civilian killings. Or does it even amount to trading justice for peace? The answer is a bit more complicated. Mediation is a tool that avoids ‘being re-active’. More importantly, it helps focus on the number one priority, i.e., the safety of the Ukrainian people through a complete ceasefire. Furthermore, a mediator’s skill of strategic empathy (also a tool of statecraft) will further help understand Mr. Putin’s underlying drivers and constraints.

   Furthermore, scholars like Zartman (1981) have argued that power parity between disputing parties is pivotal to the success of internation mediation. Indeed, there exists a huge power imbalance between Russia and Ukraine – Russia commands the world’s second most powerful military, whereas Ukraine, a nation of rightly 44 million people, was relying on the pinky promises (or security assurance) made by Russia in the Budapest Memorandum. However, U.S. President joe Biden’s strategy of making American intelligence (about Russia’s intention to invade Ukraine under false pretexts) publicly accessible, equipped Ukraine with the ‘power of solidarity’ which balanced or even tipped the scale in its favour. As a result, Russia is cornered, Ukraine has the solidarity of the world, Germany shed its pacifism and took a harsher stand against Russia by halting the Nord Stream 2 project, and Finland and Sweden are being pushed closer to NATO membership… Thus, opting for mediation is the only way left for Russia to save face and escape the sanctions that have crippled its economy.

   For the West, going ahead with mediation presents itself as an opportunity to build a Europe of common security, common prosperity and peace. Simply put, this could be a starting point to include Russia in the security infrastructure of Europe (like it did with East Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989) – an opportunity that was missed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.

India fits the bill

Mediation is certainly feasible between Russia and Ukraine because there exists a willingness to talk. But for this to commence, the approval of the parties concerned will be crucial. Much depends on the identity of the mediator. With the recent diplomatic visits to India, by the U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser for International Economics, the British Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and Minister for Women and Equalities, and the Russia Foreign Minister, shows that the world expects India to play a more active role in the Ukrainian crisis.

   This is India’s golden chance to establish itself as a global power. More importantly, plying mediator in this dispute is in India’s long term interest in countering the China threat – especially with a growing “no limits” partnership between Russia and China. Moreover, with the rise of China and its belligerence, its relationship with the West has soured. As a result, the U.S. and its allies need India as a strategic partner to balance the rise of China in the Indo-Pacific; it is for this reason, that India is now a member of the Quad.

   For now, India is right is not taking sides. Its relationship with the then-Soviet Union was forged to balance against-China (as the U.S. was cosying up to China). But with the Ukraine invasion and western sanctions, Russia is now more dependent on China. Hence, if India wants the best of both worlds, it must step up and live up to its claim of becoming a ‘Vishwa-Guru’ (or world leader).

 

 

Push the policy needle forward on migrant support

Amidst scattered experimentation now, the Centre must offer strategic policy guidance for inter-State coordination

MUKTA NAIK & VARUN AGGARWAL

Only two years ago, in the wake of a nationwide lockdown, India was left shocked by the plight of migrant workers walking hundreds of kilometers, facing hunger, exhaustion and violence, to get to the safety of their home villages. The dire circumstances of the migrants tugged at our collective heartstrings. They became the focus of large-scale relief efforts by governments and civil society alike. The Government ramped up the One Nation One Ration Card (ONORC) project, announced the Affordable Rental Housing Complexes (ARHC) scheme, set up the e-Shram portal and began to draft a migration policy. These initiatives generated hope that the migrant crisis of 2020 would be a turning point, setting India firmly on a policy path by offering adequate citizenship and the accompanying social, economic and political rights to internal migrants.

Still a tale of distress

Two years on, migrant distress has disappeared from our television screens but continues to be a lived reality. Repeated surveys have found that the incomes of migrant households levels, even after returning to cities. Migrants are finding less work and their children eating less. The post-1991 poverty alleviation of almost 300 million Indians, driven by migration out of farm work, is being undone. Despite this, cohesive migration policy guidance remains elusive. Instead, disconnected policy initiatives and technocratic fixes chase specific agendas while nativism re-asserts itself through domicile quotas and reservations. The agenda of migrant inclusion has been pushed to periphery of our collective consciousness.

   This is not something India can afford to precipitate. Today, a third of the nation’s workforce is mobile. Migrants fuel critical sectors such as manufacturing, constructions, hospitality, logistics and commercial agriculture. Despite clear economic and humanitarian reasoning to bring migrants back into the policy discourse, the current policy scenario is at best fragmented and at worst waning. To course correct, we must recognise the entrenched structural constraints slowing the migration policy momentum and take strategic steps to push the policy needle forward.

A politicized phenomenon

First, we must recognise that migration is a highly politicized phenomenon in India. States are highly influenced by the political economy of migration. ‘Destination States’ experience a tension between economic needs, which require migrant labour, and political needs, which promote nativist policies that impose domicile restrictions on employment and social security. On the flip side, the ‘sending States’ are highly motivated to serve their “own people” because they vote in their source villages. This fragmented policy response to internal migration follows from State-specific calculations on what political dividends might be reaped (or lost) by investing fiscal and administrative resources towards migrants. Moreover, development policy in India has bet big on rural development as an antidote to migration. This widespread ‘sedentary bias’ continues to influence policy even though migration is an important pathway for impoverished marginalized rural households to find economic security (and social emancipation).

   Second, migrants are a perennially fuzzy category in policy discourse, located inside two larger categories that have long troubled policymakers: the unorganized worker and the urban poor. Even the e-Shram portal, which has made impressive progress in registering unorganized workers, has been unable to accurately distinguish and target migrants. Policy interventions in major urban destinations continue to conflate the urban poor with low-income migrants. Hence, slum development continues as the primary medium for alleviating migrant concerns, while in reality, most migrants live on worksites that are entirely out of the policy gaze. There seems to be an implicit assumption in the policy circles: if we cannot solve the problems of informality, how can we help migrants? Further, it is assumed that migrants will be automatically catered to with the formalization of the economy, the labour market, the housing market, finance and so on. The pushes the timeline for addressing the migrant issue far out. It is no longer an urgent priority.

Gaps in the data

Third, migration policy discourse is seemingly paralyzed by the now well-acknowledged failure of official datasets to capture the actual scale and the frequency of internal migration in India. Data systems designed to periodically record only one spatial location have posed great challenges to welfare delivery for up to 500 million people who are part of multi-locational migrant households. The novel corona virus pandemic has placed a sharp focus on problems such as educating and vaccinating those children who accompany their migrant parents, or ensuring that migrant women avail maternity benefits at multiple locations.

   Policy in India often emerges from the ground up, taking decades to cement into national law and standard practice. We have seen this in education and food security. In migration too, despite the structural constraints outlined above, it is heartening to see many initiatives on the ground that have immense potential to influence strategic shifts in migration policy. For example, many States have initiated data projects that can track migrants and generate dynamic real-time data that aid welfare delivery. Maharashtra's Migration Tracking System (MTS), which focuses on women and children has been successfully piloted in five districts. Chhattisgarh’s State Migrant Workers Policy is premised on registering migrant workers at source and tracking them through phone-based outreach system.

    In States, a heightened awareness about migrants’ issues is locating initiatives in departments other than labour, which has traditionally been the nodal department for migrant welfare. For example, Maharashtra’s MTS is located within the Women and Child Development Department. However, there is further need for multisectoral approaches underpinned by a strategic convergence across government departments and initiatives. Odisha’s Planning and Convergence Department, which offers an institutional mechanism for inter-departmental coordination, is one possible model.

The Centre has a lead role

In this scenario of well-meaning but scattered experimentation, migrants would be well served if the Centre played a proactive role by offering strategic policy guidance and a platform for inter-State coordination. State-level political economy constraints make the Centre’s role particularly crucial in addressing issues of inter-State migrant workers at ‘destination States’. The NITI Aayog’s Draft Policy on Migrant Workers is a positive step forward in articulating policy priorities and indication suitable institutional frameworks, and deserves a speedy release.

   At a time when economic recovery and inclusive growth are urgent policy goals, migration policy can hardly afford to gestate. Strategic initiatives to provide migrates safety nets regardless of location as well as bolster their ability to migrate safely and affordably must keep up the momentum towards migrant-supportive policy.

 

शुक्रवार, 8 अप्रैल 2022

THE HINDU EDITORIAL - APRIL 4, 2022

 

THE HINDU EDITORIAL – APRIL 4, 2022

 

For a full repeal

The relaxation of AFSPA is welcome, but the demand for full repeal should be considered

In what is clearly to nod to the vociferous demand for the repeal of the unpopular Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) from several States in the northeast, especially after 13 civilians were killed in Mon district in Nagaland in December last year, the Union Home Ministry has decided to considerably reduce the number of “disturbed areas” under the Act in three States. The order, from April 1, is applicable for six months. In Nagaland, while AFSPA was removed from the jurisdiction of 15 police stations in seven districts, it remains in place in 57 police station in 13 districts. The relaxation has been most substantial in Assam, where it has been removed entirely from 23 districts and partially from one, thus limiting its operation fully to only nine districts. In Manipur, on the other hand, only 15 police station areas in six districts have been excluded from the disturbed area notification, and the Act is still in force in 82 police stations in 16 districts, including several hill districts whether or not they adjoin the international boundary. As things stand, the Government’s decision to relax the application of the Act in specific areas seems to stem from the reduction in violence and also administrative reasons rather than as a response to the burning question on whether the Act is essential to security operations in these States, which have experienced insurgencies of various degrees in the past.

   While this piecemeal gesture would be welcomed by the residents in these areas in particular, the popular demand for the repeal of the Act in full from the three States remains unfulfilled. Despite the vociferous protests from security forces for the retention of the Act, human rights organizations, sections of civil society and committees including the five-member committee led by retired Supreme Court judge B.P. jeevan Reddy in 2005, have steadfastly called for its repeal. The committee in particular had suggested that the Act had created an impression that the people of the northeast States were being targeted for hostile treatment and that the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act could instead be suitably amended to tackle terrorism. The Supreme Court-appointed Justice N. Santosh Hegde committee, in 2013, which investigated “encounter” killings in Manipur, suggested that the Act must be properly reviewed every six months to see if its implementation is necessary, but extensions of the purview of the Act have proceeded as routine affairs. In 2016, the Supreme Court had also ruled that the armed forces could not be immune from investigation for excesses committed during the discharge of their duties even in “disturbed areas”, in effect circumscribing the conditions in which the immunity is applied. These beg the question again – why should the Act remain in the Statute?

 

 

Lift spending

The Centre must crank up capital spending if it wants to stoke the economy

Official industrial data from February shows output in the eight core sectors grew at the fastest pace in four months at 5.8%, aided liberally by a low base effect – production had contracted 3.3% a year earlier. However, when compared with January 2022, output in all of these sectors actually declined, with the overall index contracting 5.2%. Electricity generation, a good indicator of business activity and which contributes about 20% to the weight of the index declined 3.3% from the preceding month. Steel, another index heavyweight that feeds into various sectors of the economy from housing to cars to white goods and small-scale engineering and parts units, dipped 5.2% from January 2022. Making up the largest component of the index, at about 28%, is the refinery products category. For a sector that facilitates other industries by powering mobility, output slid 8% sequentially. The Omicron wave, early in the calendar year, coupled with rising prices likely dampened demand, signaling uneven economic recovery from the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic. The road to a full recovery looks long and bumpy, as the latest production levels are still below, or barely above, those seen pre-pandemic. Inflation, which has already breached the Reserve Bank of India’s upper tolerance limit of 6% two months running, is a threat to consumer demand. If demand remains muted, or worse, slips further, the domino effect upstream will only impact the core sectors further. The RBI’s Monetary Policy Committee has its work cut out in a meeting later this week, when the paned will decide on benchmark interest rates that could potentially influence inflation.

   At the same time, government spending, which could set the pace for overall growth in a stuttering economy, has not roared forward. Capital expenditure grew a mere 0.8% in February from a year earlier. Even though capex had risen about 20% in the April-February 11-month period, the Centre still had about 1.2 lakh crore rupees left to be spent in March, and it appears unlikely that the Government would have met its revised capex target of 6 lakh crore rupees for FY22. Though tax revenues have been robust, the Government likely held back on capital expenditure to help offset the lack of divestment proceeds it had budgeted for. Given geopolitical tensions, the stock market has been too volatile for the Government to go ahead with the initial public offer for LIC. The sale of stake in BPCL has also not proceeded apace. Despite these roadblocks, the Government may have little choice but to crank up capital spending early in the new fiscal if it wants to stoks the economy. The multiplier effect would not only benefit industries such as cement and steel, but may also help crowd in private investment, spurring job creation, which has been the economy’s Achilles heel for a while now.

 

Yes, a Ukraine peace plan is possible

Even if it does not fully meet the requirements of either Moscow or Kyiv, it would at least prevent a wider conflagration

M.K. NARAYANAN

Several weeks into the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which has become a virtual proxy war with the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) providing military assistance to Ukraine to persist in its fight against Russia, the fog of war has not lifted. Some direct talks between Russian and Ukrainian representatives have taken place but these have been of little avail. At this point it seems unlikely that an end to the ongoing humanitarian disaster is in sight.

Boost for the U.S.

It is increasingly evident that this is a war that nobody wants, least of all the Ukrainians or even the Russians; yet no one seems to be making the right moves to end the conflict. For NATO and its allies in Europe, this is not a conflict they wished to wage at this time. For the U.S., however, the unity displayed by NATO currently has been a major boost, reinforcing its belief that European security is inextricably linked to a strong and united NATO. Whether with the help of NATO, the U.S. has succeeded in isolating Russia in Europe is still an open question, but the U.S. can feel satisfied with the outcome as of now.

    In the meantime, the carnage in Ukraine continues. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, for his part, might claim that he is ready to discuss neutrality, even as Russia, while continuing with its military operations, has been sending out feelers that it could consider limiting the conflict. However, in effect the two antagonists appear to be talking past rather than to one another.

   What is more unfortunate is that the world is standing by, allowing the conflict to continue – with the West encouraging rather than restraining Mr. Zelensky from ‘baiting’ Russian President Vladimir Putin. Neither the United Nations, nor any of the major countries, have seriously explored any peace moves, nor followed up on what Mr. Zelensky means when he says that he is ready to discuss neutrality. To an outsider, it looks as if Ukraine has become a pawn in the power game between the West and Russia.

Seize the chance                                                                                                 

If indeed the world is approaching a tipping point, then what is needed is less, not more, of the kind of grandstanding employed by Mr. Zelensky (occasionally laced with a demand for direct talks with Mr. Putin), or the charade of negotiations that are currently taking place between Ukraine and Russian negotiators. It may be too much to expect the Russian side to demonstrate proper contriteness for the unfortunate killing of thousands of civilians, but pressure should be brought on Russia to try and enter into more realistic negotiations with Ukraine. The West also needs to play a more active role, and try to devise a ‘Peace Plan’ taking advantage of the occasional statements made by both sides about their willingness to halt the conflict.

   The crying need today is for a peace plan which even if it does not fully satisfy the requirements of either Russia or Ukraine – and obliquely that of the U.S. and the West – will at least ensure a cessation of hostilities and prevent the conflict from becoming further enlarged, resulting in a wider conflagration involving more countries and more powers. It should not prove too difficult, or beyond the realm of possibility, to arrive at a peace arrangement or devise a plan, that would accommodate Ukraine’s professed need for neutrality (with or without assured guarantees) and Russia’s concern about the further Eastward push of NATO (that implicitly threatens Russia’s security).

    Working out an arrangement down to the smallest detail would, however, entail a great deal of ‘shuttle diplomacy’ by interlocutors acceptable to both Russia and Ukraine, who also have the necessary ‘gravitas’ to undertake such a task. Speed is of the essence, as with each passing day, the risk of a wider conflagration increases. The world is not bereft of individuals who can play a critical role as interlocutors at this time, but it demands both honestly of purpose and the will to overcome the odds.

The use of sanctions

To begin with, the West should reconsider its current obsession with imposing additional sanctions on Russia, in the expectation that this would lead to the collapse of Russia and an end to the ‘regality’ of Mr. Putin. It might be argued that there is greater merit in imposing economic sanctions on a country than in launching an all-out war.

    Notwithstanding this, and despite the pressure that sanctions have put on the Russian economy (its economy is expected to plunge by anything between 12% to 15% over the next few months), the jury is still out on whether economic pain of this kind would lead any country – at least in the short and the medium term – to alter its mindset. Iran is a classic instance.

    In the meantime, several well regarded economists have come out with their views regarding the ‘unintended consequences’ of the overuse of sanctions. Their refrain is that “the over use of economic weapons could reverse the process of globalization that has allowed the modern world to prosper”. Similar concerns exist about the fragmentation of the global payment situation. Certain experts have again warned that the sanctions regime placed on Russia, unless calibrated very carefully, could exacerbate food shortages in low income countries. The short point is that economic sanctions, while seemingly an excellent option, can also have deleterious consequences for much of the world.

    It would also be interesting to speculate on some of the spillover effects of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Indisputable, Russia’s inability to coerce Ukraine into submission within a very short time frame has dented Russia’s image as also that of its vaunted military machine. While many explanations for Russia’s slow advance in Ukraine may be forthcoming, what must have surprised, if not shocked, Russia is that the 30-nation NATO should have displayed this degree of cohesion in the face of the Russian onslaught. This would have been a wakeup call for Russia, and a clear boost to the efforts of the West to contain what it perceived as Russian neo-imperialism.

What is ahead for Russia

If Mr. Putin’s effort to ‘correct history’ was the trigger for the Ukraine crisis – one that did not quite follow the script he had hoped for- there could be similar and equally less palatable fallout for the West as well: more specifically, the U.S. and its hopes to reclaim global leadership. According to many analysts, one fallout of the current conflict in Ukraine is likely to be a further cementing of the already deepening Russia-China strategic relationship, which has been in evidence over the past several months. The degree of unity displayed by the West, and the determination to stand together, is expected to result in taking the existing Russia-China relationship to the next level, approximating to what existed prior to the Great Communist Divide in the early 1960s. Some analysts even argue that a clue to this can be found in some of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent utterances, wherein he has talked of the need to revive the spirit of the Korean War of the 1950s.

   Several possibilities arise if the Russia-West divide was to crystallize along the current lines. Almost certainly, one will see a reshaping of the world energy map, if current embargoes on Russian oil and gas were to continue.

   Oil flows to Europe would thereupon come mainly from West Asia and the U.S.; in turn countries such as China and India may become major importers of crude from Russia. It is uncertain at this time whether this would be a practicable proposition over the longer haul, but new permutations and combinations are certain to take place.

India’s stand

Next, even as China and Russia relations become further strengthened, the question before India would be how it should position itself. Till now, India had taken a consistent stand of not criticizing or condemning Russia on any account, including its invasion of Ukraine. This was largely based on India’s long-term defence and other relationships with Russia. This could undergo changes. One might also anticipate a further churn in the politics of West Asia – where the Abraham Accords in 2020 seemed to bring a certain degree of normalcy and stability. Iran’s posture and politics will also play an important role in shaping the politics of this region.

   One thought that cannot be dismissed as being entirely frivolous is whether repeated accusations leveled by the West against Mr. Putin of attempting to use nuclear weapons to devastate Ukraine, are a prelude to, or a curtain raiser, for experimentation – more importantly, preparing the public to consider removing the current taboo regarding nuclear weapons. Repeated references, without providing any evidence, would seem to suggest that this might possibly be a smokescreen for such experimentation. For instance, it may not be too outlandish for both sides to consider the use of miniaturized nukes with precision (drone delivery mechanisms. If the Russia-Ukraine war were to persist, one could even envisage the possibility of the use of micro nuclear payloads mated to miniaturized precision delivery mechanisms. One hopes that before this, saner voices across the world would prepare the way for a peace package in Ukraine.

 

 

A far-reaching verdict that ends a regressive exception

In pronouncing the end of the marital rape exception, the Karnataka High Court has delivered a nuanced judgment

JAYNA KOTHARI

Over the last several months, arguments challenging the constitutionality of the marital rape exception in Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) had gripped the Delhi High Court. While the judgment in those petitions is still awaited, in one clean swoop Justice M. Nagaprasanna of the Karnataka High Court on March 23, 2022, in the case of Hrishikesh sahoo vs State of Karnataka, pronounced the end of the marital rape exception.

The background

Outcomes in judicial proceedings are almost always shaped by the cases which come before the courts. This judgment was a result of a unique case where a woman had filed a criminal complaint of rape against her husband due to the repeated acts of sexual assault she had to face. The police registered her complaint under Section 376 notwithstanding the marital rape exception, a charge sheet was filed and the Sessions Judge took cognizance and framed charges under Section 376. The husband filed an application to drop the charge of Section 376 but the Sessions Judge rejected it. This led to the husband approaching the High Court seeking to quash the criminal proceedings.

    In a nuanced and far-reaching judgment, Justice Nagaprasanna refused to quash the charge of rape against the husband. He held that if a man, being a husband is exempted for his acts of sexual assault, it would destroy women’s right to equality, which is the very soul of the Constitution. He held that the Constitution recognizes and grants equal status to women, but the exception to marital rape in the IPC amounts to discrimination because a wife is treated as subordinate to the husband. The Constitution considers marriage as an association of equals and does not in any sense depict women to be subordinate to men and guarantees women the fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 the right to live with dignity, personal liberty, bodily integrity, sexual autonomy, right to reproductive choices, right to privacy, right to freedom of speech and expression. He held that the exemption of the husband on committal of such assault/rape cannot be so absolute that it becomes a license for commission of a crime; in provocative words he stated, “a man is a man; an act is an act; rape is a rape, be it performed by a man the “husband” on the women “wife”, and refused to quash the case.

Earlier judgments

There have been other judgments which have already been a precursor to doing away with this exception. In Independent Thought vs Union of Indian (2017), the supreme Court of India diluted it and removed the exception to marital rape to a wife not below 15 years and made it 18 years. The Court stated that this would not amount to removing the exception to marital rape for women above 18 years as that was not the case before it, but Justice Madan B. Lokur in similar words held, “… a rape is a rape… A rape that actually occurs cannot legislatively be simply wished away or legislatively denied as non-existent….” The Court held that a girl cannot be treated as a commodity having no say over her body or someone who has no right to deny sexual intercourse to her husband and that the human rights of a girl child are very much alive and kicking whether she is married or not.

Roots of the principle

The exception to marital rape in common law was due to the dictum by Chief Justice Matthew Hale of Britain in 1736 where he stated: “But the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband which she cannot retract.” The concept that by marriage, a woman gave up her body to the husband was accepted as an enduring principle of common law, due to which a husband could not be guilty of raping his wife. This was therefore translated into criminal codes, including the Indian Penal Code which India adopted.

    This principle has now been completely abolished. In the United Kingdom, in 1991, the exception to marital rape was done away with in the case of R. vs R. The House of Lords held that where the common law rule no longer even remotely represents what is the true position of a wife in present-day society, the duty of the court is to take steps to alter the rule. The court held that a husband’s immunity as expounded by Chief Justice Matthew Hale no longer exists and took the view that the time had arrived when the law should declare that a rapist remains a rapist subject to the criminal law, irrespective of his relationship with his victim. It held that it was the duty of the court to remove a common law fiction which had become anachronistic and offensive and that there was no justification for the marital exemption in rape.

    That was in 1991, more than 30 years ago in the U.K. The Karnataka High Court took a similar view of its duties as a constitutional court in the present case and held that the exception to marital rape in Section 375 is regressive, wherein a woman is treated as a subordinate to the husband and against eh constitutional guarantee of equality. Our courts have now truly pronounced the death knell of the marital rape exception.

 

बुधवार, 6 अप्रैल 2022

THE HINDU (SUNDAY) - APRIL 3, 2022

 

THE HINDU NEWS (SUNDAY) - APRIL 3, 2022

 

New Criminal Bill

How does the new Criminal Procedure (Identification) Bill, 2022 propose to collect sensitive data?

VIJAITA SINGH

The story so far: On March 28, Minister of State for Home Ajay Kumar Mishra introduced The Criminal Procedure (Identification) Bill, 2022 in Lok Sabha. If passed, it will allow police and prison authorities to collect, store and analyse physical and biological samples including retina and iris scans of convicted, arrested and detained persons. At the introduction stage, Opposition members opposed. At the introduction stage, Opposition members opposed the Bill terming it “unconstitutional” and an attack on privacy.

What is the legislation about?

-The Bill seeks to repeal The Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920. The over 100-year-old Act’s scope was limited to capturing of finger impression, foot-print impressions and photographs of convicted prisoners and certain category of arrested and non-convicted persons on the order of a Magistrate. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 2022 Bill said that new “measurement” techniques being used in advanced countries are giving credible and reliable results and are recognized the world over. It said that the 1920 Act does not provide for taking these body measurements as many of the techniques and technologies had not been developed then.

What are the major changes proposed?

-It proposes four major changes. First, it would define “measurements” to include “signature, handwriting, iris and retina scan, physical, biological samples and their analysis, etc.” It does not specify what analysis means, implying that it may also include storing DNA samples. The “etc.” mentioned in the text of the Bill could give unfettered powers to law enforcement agencies to interpret the law as their convenience, sometimes to the disadvantage of the accused.

    Second, it empowers the National Crime Records Bureau of India (NCRB), under the Union Home Ministry, to collect, store and preserve the record of measurements for at least 75 years. The NCRB will be able to share the data with other law enforcement agencies as well. Police is a State subject and NCRB works under the Union government, and experts contend this provision may impinge on federalism.

    Third, it empowers a Magistrate to direct any person to give vital details, which till now was reserved for convicts and those involved in heinous crimes. Fourth, it empowers police or prison officers up to the rank of a Head Constable to take details of any person who resists or refuses to do so.

What are some other changes?

-The Bill also seeks to apply to persons detained under any preventive detention law. The Bill also authorizes taking vital details of “other persons” for identification and investigation in criminal matters. It doesn’t define the “other persons”, implying its ambit extends beyond convicts, arrested persons, or detainees. The Bill’s stated objective is it provides legal sanction for taking such details and will make the investigation of crime more efficient and expeditious, and help in increasing the conviction rate. Congress member Manish Tewari pointed out in the Lok Sabha that Article 20(3) of the Constitution stats that “no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” BSP member Ritesh Pandey opposed the Bill saying it proposes to collect samples even from those engaged in political protests.

Is there a precedent?

-The Karnataka Assembly passed The Identification of Prisoners (Karnataka Amendment) Bill in 2021, to amend the 1920 Act for application in the State. The Bill expands the collection to include blood samples, DNA, voice and iris scans “for effective surveillance and prevention of breach of peace and crime.” It empowers the Superintendent of Police or Deputy Commissioner of Police to order collection in addition to a magistrate to avoid delays and reduce the workload on the Judiciary. As the provisions of the Bill were repugnant with the 1920 Act, a Central Government’s Act, Governor Thawar Chand Gehlot reserved the Bill for consideration of the President of the India. Under the process, the Bill is sent for inter-ministerial consultation. The Bill is yet to be cleared by the MHA. Now, the Government has introduced a fresh legislation to replace the 1920 Act that will be applicable across the country. The States have been empowered to notify rules under the Act to specify the manner in which details could be recorded, preserved, disseminated and destructed and “any other matter which is to be prescribed, or in respect of which provision is to be made.”

    Tamil Nadu introduced and notified The Identification of Prisoners (Tamil Nadu Amendments) Act in 2010. The act allows the police the draw “blood samples” other than the specified measurements from the limited categories of suspects and convicts defined in the 1920 Act. Though President’s assent is awaited for the Karnataka Bill, the Tamil Nadu Act has been in practice for more than a decade after it received the assent of the Governor.

Why is Sri Lanka under a state of Emergency?

What has brought on the economic crisis is the island nation? How are India and other countries helping?

MEERA SRINIVASAN

The story so far: On Friday night, a day after angry citizens converged in front of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s Colombo residence, demanding he step down immediately, he declared a state of Emergency in Sri Lanka. An extraordinary gazette notification said the Emergency, coming into immediate effect, was “in the interest of public security, the protection of public order and the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community.” On Saturday, the government imposed an all-island curfew, restricting movement until Monday morning. Sri Lanka is in the midst of a sharp economic downturn that has led to severe food shortages and growing public resentment.

What triggered the crisis?

-Sri Lanka’s economic crisis can be traced to two key developments in the immediate past – the Easter Sunday bombings of 2019 that deterred tourists and the pandemic since early 2020 that stalled recovery and further drained the economy. As it grappled with an unprecedented challenge, the Rajapaksa regime made policy choices that are now proving to be costly. It cut the government’s tax revenue substantially and rushed into an ‘organic only’ agricultural policy that will likely slash this year’s harvest by half. The weak and debt-ridden economy with the lingering strain of the pandemic and ill-advised policies accelerated the downward spiral.

What were the economic indicators?

-COVID-19 hit Sri Lanka’s key foreign revenue earning sectors hard. Earnings from tourism, exports, and worker remittances fell sharply in the last two years. But the country could not stop importing essentials, and its dollar account began dwindling. Fast draining foreign reserves, a glaring trade deficit, and a related Balance of Payments problem came as crucial signals. Colombo’s huge foreign loan obligations and the drop in domestic production compounded the economic strain.

When did things begin to worsen?

-The long-simmering crisis made its first big announcement during last August’s food emergency, when supplies were badly affected. It was soon followed by fears of a sovereign default in late 2021, which Sri Lanka averted. But without enough dollars to pay for the country’s high import bill, the island continued facing severe shortage of essentials – from fuel, cooking gas, and staple foodgrains to medicines.

How did the crisis manifest itself on the ground?

-Consumers could not find the most basic things such as petrol, LPG cylinders, kerosene, or milk in the market. They spent hours waiting in long queues outside fuel stations or shops. Supermarket shelves were either empty or had products with high price tags that most could not afford. For instance, the price of one kg of milk powder, a staple item in dairy-deficient Sri Lanka, suddenly shot up to nearly LKR 2000 in March.

   Be it cooking gas, oils, ice, pulses, vegetables, fish, meat, consumers found themselves paying substantially more, or simply had to forego the item. The fuel shortage has led to long blackouts – up to 13 hours the island.

What is the situation now?

-The value of the Sri Lankan rupee has dropped to 300 against a U.S. dollar (and even more than 400 in the black market), putting importers in a difficult spot.

    The government is unable to pay for its import shipments, forcing consignments to leave the Colombo port. For the average citizen contending with COVID-induced salary cuts and job losses, the soaring living costs have brought more agony.

Has the government sought help?

-Yes, including from India which has extended $2.4 billion this year, and China, that is considering a fresh request from Colombo for $2.5billion assistance, in addition to the $2.8 billion it has extended since the pandemic broke out. The government has decided to negotiate an International Monetary Fund programme, while seeking support from other multilateral and bilateral sources. But even with all this help, Sri Lanka can barely manage. Recovery will neither be fast nor easy, say experts.

How has it affected the people?

-Sri Lankans are seething with anger, going by public demonstrations and protests. They want the President to step down immediately and the ruling clan to leave the country’s helm. They have been agitating in different parts of the country, including near the President’s home. Former military man Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who came to power on a huge mandate in 2019, is Sri Lanka’s most unpopular leader today. In a televised address on March 16, he promised “tough decisions to find solutions to the inconveniences that people are experiencing.” Following the protests near his home, Mr. Rajapaksa said “extremists” were plotting an “Arab Spring and on Friday night, he declared a state of Emergency.

                                            

Roubles for fuel, defence deals with Russia

How is India circumventing the sanctions route to ensure supplies are not stopped? What is in the pipeline?

DINANKAR PERI

The story so far: The last two weeks saw a flurry of visits by senior officials from the West to convince India not to undermine sanctions on Russia by opting for payments in national currencies as also not to increase purchase of discounted oil from Russia. On Friday, Russia Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was in New Delhi, the first high-level visit since the start of the Russian offensive in Ukraine.

What is the status of oil purchases from Russia?

-“We have started buying Russian oil and have bought at least three to four days of supply,” Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman said on Friday. Mr. Lavrov reiterated that Russia is moving ahead with the use of national currencies in lieu of dollar payments with both India and China and these efforts would be “intensified”.

    “I have no doubt that a way would be found to bypass the artificial impediments which illegal unilateral sanctions by the West create. This relates also to the area of military and technical cooperation. We have no doubt that the solution would be found and respective ministries are working, “ Mr. Lavrov said, addressing a press conference after bilateral talks with his Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar.

     The developments came a day after the U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser for international Economics Daleep Singh warned of “consequences” to countries that actively attempt to circumvent or backfill the sanctions.

     In sharp comments on Thursday during a conversation with visiting U.K. Foreign Secretary Liz Truss, Mr. Jaishankar termed it a “campaign” against India for buying Russian oil at discounted prices while European countries remain the biggest buyers of oil and gas from Russia despite their announcements to scale it down.

    India and Russia have been working on streamlining payments through the rupee-rouble mechanism circumventing the SWIFT systems and the dollar route. Towards this, earlier in the week, a team from Russia’s central bank met officials from the Reserve Bank of India to iron out issues and identify banks that have no exposure to the Western sanctions through which payments can be made. Mr. Jaishankar informed Parliament recently that a special inter-ministerial group led by the Finance Ministry has been tasked with resolving payment issues for trade with Russia.

    According to Reuters, India bought at least 13 million barrels of Russian oil since the Ukraine war began on February 24, a steep rise from last year, when India bought 16 million barrels of Russian oil in all of 2021.

What about defence deals?

-The defence Ministry and the Services have carried out assessments and are closely monitoring the impact the sanctions can have on timely deliveries and supplies from Russia as several major deals are also underway. Officials have stated that while some shipping delays were possible, there would not be any dent in the Army’s operational preparedness along the borders especially the Line of Actual control.

    In addition, the armed forces have also made significant emergency procurements in the last two years since the standoff in eastern Ladakh and have stocked up on spares and ammunition. So, there shouldn’t be any immediate urgency for spares and other requirements, officials noted.

    For the two countries, payment by a rupee-rouble arrangement is not new. For instance, for the $5.43 billion deal for S-400 air defence systems signed in October 2018, with the looming threat of U.S. sanctions under CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Though Sanctions Act), the two sides had worked out payments through the rupee-rouble exchange. In fact, the delivery schedule got slightly delayed as the payment details were being worked out. Last December, India began taking deliveries and the first unit has been deployed on the western border. The second unit is scheduled to arrive shortly, officials stated.

     In addition, several new deals are in the pipeline including 12 Su-30MKI aircraft and 21 MiG-29 fighter jets for the Indian Air Force. However, the Defence Ministry is carrying out a review of all direct import deals and some of them including those from Russia are expected to be dropped as part of the push towards domestic manufacturing.

    According to a recent report from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India’s defence imports reduced by 21% between 2012-16 and 2017-21 and while Russia continues to remain the largest arms supplier, the percentage has dropped. “Russia was the largest supplier of major arms to India in both 2012-16 and 2017-21, but India’s imports of Russia arms dropped by 47% between the two periods as several large programmes for Russians arms wound down,” the report said.

 

 

How has BIMSTEC finetuned its agenda?

What are the aims and functions of the multilateral grouping in handling challenges in the Bay of Bengal region?

KOLLOR BHATTARCHERJEE

The story so far: Amid the financial crisis of 1997, leading Southeast Asian and South Asian nations came together to form the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). The underlying factor behind the grouping was that if connected together, the economic powerhouses of South Asia and Southeast Asia could deal with the challenges of pursuing free market economies in the limits imposed by local political and economic factors. In its 25th year, and at its fifth summit held in hybrid format in Colombo, the organization adopted a charter which aims at providing greater coordination among the seven members – Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar and Thailand.

Why is there a need to revitalize the multilateral grouping?

-The new charter comes at a time when the need for an alternative regional-global organization is increasingly being felt because of the moribund nature of SAARC which has not met since November 2014. For long, BIMSTEC existed as a platform for policy dialogue but the global churning over sanctions on Russia after the war in Ukraine appears to have contributed towards finetuning the focus of the grouping. It wants to be an organization which can find autonomous space away from bigger trade and defence groupings and wok for the development of the region around of Bay of Bengal.

What does BIMSTEC’s connectivity vision aim to achieve?

-The BIMSTEC Master Plan for Transport Connectivity seeks to connect several major transport projects in India, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Thailand and establish a shipping network across the Bay of Bengal that will benefit the littoral states as well as the Bay of Bengal dependent states like Nepal and Bhutan. The BBIN connectivity project of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal is expected to be merged with the port and infrastructure projects like the Sittwe port of Myanmar and Payra port of Bangladesh and Colombo of Sri Lanka.

Is the Free Trade Agreement plan feasible?

-A framework agreement for a Free Trade Agreement among the members of BIMSTEC was signed in 2004, and has been revived again. The idea is to create stronger trade relations among players in the Bay of Bengal region but negotiations on finalizing legal instruments for coastal shipping, typing up road transport and other issues will take time to be shorted out.

What is the security pillar aiming to achieve?

-The Bay of Bengal has enormous significance from the security point of view. It borders the Strait of Malacca which is the main energy lane for the eastern and Southeast Asian nation. That apart, Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have often suffered from terrorism. The security relevance of BIMSTEC, therefore, has been growing especially after the Easter Sunday bombings in Sri Lanka in 2019. India will steer the security pillar of BIMSTEC and is expected to coordinate regionwide security cooperation on jointly agreed issues.

Will it mediate in bilateral issues?

-BIMSTC members like Myanmar and Bangladesh have challenges like the Rohingya crisis that both sides have been dealing with since 2017. The tense relations between the two countries had hampered smooth working of the BIMSTEC for some time. But as of now the grouping, by including Myanmar in the summit in Colombo, has indicated that it will not interfere in domestic political problems and nor will it allow any member to be sidelined within the organization. SAARC has been weighed down by bilateral problems between India and Pakistan and a lesson probably has been learnt to keep bilateral troubles away from a regional grouping for better coordination among the members.