THE HINDU EDITORIAL - APRIL 5, 2022

 

THE HINDU EDITORIAL – APRIL 5, 2022

 

Game for the throne Imran Khan’s moves to cling to power betray his contempt for parliamentary procedures It was certain that Imran Khan, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, would be ousted in the no-trust vote. The Opposition had put up a united face. His allies had jumped ship, reducing the ruling coalition to a minority. His party lawmakers had revolted against him. The cricketer turned-PM’s defeat was a matter of formality in a country where no Prime Minister has completed their term. On Sunday, the Deputy Speaker dismissed the no-trust motion, calling it against the Constitution, which was followed by Mr. Khan’s formal request to the President to dissolve the National Assembly. Pakistan will have to hold elections in three months, provided there is no judicial intervention. There were three bad options before Mr. Khan: resignation, no-trust vote or early elections. By choosing elections, he avoided a humiliating defeat and also sought to torpedo the Opposition’s bid to form a government for the remainder of the current Parliament’s term. Before the National Assembly convened, Mr. Khan had set the campaign pitch by accusing the Opposition of conspiring with a foreign power (an indirect reference to the U.S.) to unseat him. The current crisis would also allow him to play the victim of some foreign conspiracy and seek a fresh mandate. But the question is what price does Pakistan pay for his political manoeuvring? The conspiracy theories, the dismissal of the no-trust motion and the call for early elections all suggest Mr. Khan’s contempt for parliamentary procedures and basic democratic decency.    For the labyrinth he is in today, Mr. Khan has to blame nobody but himself. Having been a political underdog for years, he broke into Pakistan’s two-party political order in 2018 with the direct support of the military. His cocktail of religious conservatism, nationalism and anti-corruption crusade promised to build a ‘Naya Pakistan’. But while in power, he made three critical mistakes: mismanagement of the economy, mismanagement of his ties with the military and full-spectrum hostility with the Opposition. His vindictive approach towards the Opposition brought together all the major Opposition parties, which tried to cash in on the growing public resentment amid economic woes. Cracks in the government’s relationship with the military began appearing last year when Mr. Khan reportedly sparred with the establishment over the appointment of the new ISI chief. His visit to Moscow in February, immediately after Russia’s Ukraine invasion and the “neutral” policy his government adopted regarding the conflict seem to have quickened his fall. Last week, the Army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, spoke against the Russian invasion and re-emphasized the importance of Pakistan’s ties with the U.S. in a public rebuke of Mr. Khan’s pragmatism. Now, out of favour with the military, a lost majority in Parliament and faced with anger amid a worsening economic crisis, the ‘Captain’ does not have any good options before him. With his back against the wall, what he is doing for political survival is only weakening Pakistan’s non-military institutions and subverting its democratic proceedings.   A pause to reflect The Government, Bharat Biotech should strive for better communication on vaccine safety The World Health Organization’s (WHO) decision to recommend a pause in the supply of Covaxin for export is worrying. This follows an inspection of the company’s production facilities between March 14 and 22 that found “deficiencies” in the process to ensure that the vaccine produced is consistently suitable for use. Bharat Biotech, the makers of Covaxin, has said it is committed to addressing these ‘Good Manufacturing Process deficiencies’ and developing a “corrective and preventive” action plan that it will submit to the Drugs Controller General of India (DCGI). WHOO has told countries that for now they should “consider” alternative vaccines but it has also said that the data available with it suggest that Covaxin is safe and effective. The details of these lacunae are not public but Bharat Biotech has said that sophisticated equipment needed to “enhance the process stringency” were unavailable during the COVID-19 pandemic. This is not the first time that Bharat Biotech has tangled with WHO. The global body sought information at least nine times from the Hyderabad company before approving it to be a global supplier of Covaxin. In March 2021, the Brazilian health regulator, Anvisa, pointed to several problems with Bharat Biotech’s manufacturing plant ahead of an agreement by the company to sell 20 million doses of the vaccine to Brazil. This deal was ultimately terminated, but there has never been clear communication either by Bharat Biotech or the DCGI on the concerns raised by the Brazilian health body.    While India is no stranger to making and supplying billions of vaccine doses, it has historically done so with the benefit of time. The pandemic saw pulling out all the stops and the balance between safety and speed tilting towards the latter by both drug regulators, under pressure from their governments, and vaccine manufacturers, for whom gargantuan demand promised a financial windfall. Other companies, internationally too, have made mistakes in supply. AstraZeneca mistakenly supplied some volunteers who were being tested with the Oxford vaccine with half the required dose that led to surprising results. This was not disclosed until much after the trial results were made public and experts openly questioned the efficacy results. The defining characteristic of a vaccine is its safety profile and its acceptability is premised on its makers and the regulators being transparent about it at all times. Both the Government and Bharat Biotech should strive for better public communication on these fronts.

The road to Ukraine peace runs through Delhi Mediation is certainly feasible and India is well positioned to act as a ‘Vishwa-Guru’ between Russia and the West UTKARSH LEO & FAIZAN MUSTAFA Nearly 40 days ago, Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in violation of international law and its security assurances under the Budapest Memorandum, 1994. And, there are no winners in sight. Despite peace talks held on March 29, in Istanbul (Turkey), direct negotiations between the conflicting parties have failed to make much progress: a ceasefire is yet to be achieved, and the Russian attacks on the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine continue. As a result, there have been 3,455 civilian casualties recorded in Ukraine (1,417 killed and 2,038 injured) while more than four million people have fled seeking protection, safety and assistance.    Similarly, in addition to causalities on the Russian side, financial and economic sanctions imposed by the European Union and the G7 have impacted the Russian economy. Despite artificial measures to prop up the rouble, the economy is tanking, annual inflation has jumped to 15.6%, the Russian Central Bank’s forex reserves remain frozen and it cannot access financing and loans from multilateral institutions. At the global level, this war is disrupting supply chins and is causing the fuel and food prices to surge. This begs the question – if this unnecessary war has resulted in a no-win situation, why have negotiations failed to end it? Positions versus interests Past negotiations, by video conferencing or as peace talks (held in Belarus and Turkey) have failed to make much progress because the parties have been negotiating over ‘positions’ rather than ‘interests’. A ‘position’ is a surface statement of what a party wants; for example, Russia’s demand that Ukraine recognizes the separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states. Whereas, ‘interests’ are the underlying reasons behind those position; for instance, why is Russia focused on the independence of these separatist areas? Therefore, mediation as a conflicts resolution tool can assist the parties in identifying these hidden ‘interests’ and facilitate them in working towards crafting a solution that each of the parties would value – a Europe of common security and prosperity where the sovereignty of all nations (Ukraine, Russia and the West) are guaranteed.    Mediation (or assisted negotiation) is a flexible conflict resolution tool facilitated by a neutral third party. Depending on the choice of parties, it can be facilitative or evaluative and can be conducted in joint sessions or caucuses (i.e., private meetings). Additionally, its focus on collaborative bargaining producing a win-win outcome (in contrast to adversarial proceedings such as arbitration or litigation that result in a win-loss outcome) equips it to handle conflicts of all kinds: from workplace disputes to broken contracts to international conflicts. International mediation follows this process of “assisting two or more contending parties to find a solution without resorting to force”. Due to its immense potential, the Charter of the United Nations under Article 33 recognises the promise of international mediation for peaceful resolution of international disputes. Brokering peace Throughout history, individuals, countries and organizations (such as the International Committee of the Red Cross) have acted as third parties and have brokered peace between conflicting nations. Described by theorists as a form of power brokerage or a political problem solving process, international mediation has been used to resolve conflicts for hundreds of years. The best known example is of U.S. President Jimmy Carter who mediated peace between Israel and Egypt (known as the Camp David Accords of 1978) that has resulted in 44 years of peace.    Scholarship on neuroscience proves that emotions have a significant influence on cognitive processes (Kragel and LaBar 2016). If emotions are running high between conflicting parties it is very likely that either or both parties get re-active (i.e., to act without thinking). Ambrose Bierce wrote: “speak when you are angry and you will make the best speech you will ever regret’. This is where a neutral third party can act as a ;go-between’ (termed: shuttle diplomacy) to gather more information and help the parties identify their hidden interests. This helps in ensuring that conflicting parties keep their eyes on the prize. More importantly, the mediator shutting between parties helps in limiting or reducing re-active devaluation – a cognitive barrier where the disputants wrongfully construe the conflict as a zero sum game. As a result, even the value of a genuine offer coming directly from an adversary is automatically reduced in the eyes of the receiver. Therefore, subject to context and the consent of parties, the mediator can either play a passive role to facilitate communication or a more active role and exert more influence on the content of the discussion and the final solution. Focusing on the priority Certainly, international mediation has a lot to offer. But is it the right choice in the Russia-Ukraine conflict?    Despite bilateral peace talks Russian air strikes continue on Ukrainian cities resulting in civilian casualties. The voice against dictatorships will want to hold the Russian President Vladimir Putin guilty of violation the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols. It may appear that opting for mediation legitimizes past violations of international law and civilian killings. Or does it even amount to trading justice for peace? The answer is a bit more complicated. Mediation is a tool that avoids ‘being re-active’. More importantly, it helps focus on the number one priority, i.e., the safety of the Ukrainian people through a complete ceasefire. Furthermore, a mediator’s skill of strategic empathy (also a tool of statecraft) will further help understand Mr. Putin’s underlying drivers and constraints.    Furthermore, scholars like Zartman (1981) have argued that power parity between disputing parties is pivotal to the success of internation mediation. Indeed, there exists a huge power imbalance between Russia and Ukraine – Russia commands the world’s second most powerful military, whereas Ukraine, a nation of rightly 44 million people, was relying on the pinky promises (or security assurance) made by Russia in the Budapest Memorandum. However, U.S. President joe Biden’s strategy of making American intelligence (about Russia’s intention to invade Ukraine under false pretexts) publicly accessible, equipped Ukraine with the ‘power of solidarity’ which balanced or even tipped the scale in its favour. As a result, Russia is cornered, Ukraine has the solidarity of the world, Germany shed its pacifism and took a harsher stand against Russia by halting the Nord Stream 2 project, and Finland and Sweden are being pushed closer to NATO membership… Thus, opting for mediation is the only way left for Russia to save face and escape the sanctions that have crippled its economy.    For the West, going ahead with mediation presents itself as an opportunity to build a Europe of common security, common prosperity and peace. Simply put, this could be a starting point to include Russia in the security infrastructure of Europe (like it did with East Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989) – an opportunity that was missed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. India fits the bill Mediation is certainly feasible between Russia and Ukraine because there exists a willingness to talk. But for this to commence, the approval of the parties concerned will be crucial. Much depends on the identity of the mediator. With the recent diplomatic visits to India, by the U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser for International Economics, the British Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and Minister for Women and Equalities, and the Russia Foreign Minister, shows that the world expects India to play a more active role in the Ukrainian crisis.    This is India’s golden chance to establish itself as a global power. More importantly, plying mediator in this dispute is in India’s long term interest in countering the China threat – especially with a growing “no limits” partnership between Russia and China. Moreover, with the rise of China and its belligerence, its relationship with the West has soured. As a result, the U.S. and its allies need India as a strategic partner to balance the rise of China in the Indo-Pacific; it is for this reason, that India is now a member of the Quad.    For now, India is right is not taking sides. Its relationship with the then-Soviet Union was forged to balance against-China (as the U.S. was cosying up to China). But with the Ukraine invasion and western sanctions, Russia is now more dependent on China. Hence, if India wants the best of both worlds, it must step up and live up to its claim of becoming a ‘Vishwa-Guru’ (or world leader).     Push the policy needle forward on migrant support Amidst scattered experimentation now, the Centre must offer strategic policy guidance for inter-State coordination MUKTA NAIK & VARUN AGGARWAL Only two years ago, in the wake of a nationwide lockdown, India was left shocked by the plight of migrant workers walking hundreds of kilometers, facing hunger, exhaustion and violence, to get to the safety of their home villages. The dire circumstances of the migrants tugged at our collective heartstrings. They became the focus of large-scale relief efforts by governments and civil society alike. The Government ramped up the One Nation One Ration Card (ONORC) project, announced the Affordable Rental Housing Complexes (ARHC) scheme, set up the e-Shram portal and began to draft a migration policy. These initiatives generated hope that the migrant crisis of 2020 would be a turning point, setting India firmly on a policy path by offering adequate citizenship and the accompanying social, economic and political rights to internal migrants. Still a tale of distress Two years on, migrant distress has disappeared from our television screens but continues to be a lived reality. Repeated surveys have found that the incomes of migrant households levels, even after returning to cities. Migrants are finding less work and their children eating less. The post-1991 poverty alleviation of almost 300 million Indians, driven by migration out of farm work, is being undone. Despite this, cohesive migration policy guidance remains elusive. Instead, disconnected policy initiatives and technocratic fixes chase specific agendas while nativism re-asserts itself through domicile quotas and reservations. The agenda of migrant inclusion has been pushed to periphery of our collective consciousness.    This is not something India can afford to precipitate. Today, a third of the nation’s workforce is mobile. Migrants fuel critical sectors such as manufacturing, constructions, hospitality, logistics and commercial agriculture. Despite clear economic and humanitarian reasoning to bring migrants back into the policy discourse, the current policy scenario is at best fragmented and at worst waning. To course correct, we must recognise the entrenched structural constraints slowing the migration policy momentum and take strategic steps to push the policy needle forward. A politicized phenomenon First, we must recognise that migration is a highly politicized phenomenon in India. States are highly influenced by the political economy of migration. ‘Destination States’ experience a tension between economic needs, which require migrant labour, and political needs, which promote nativist policies that impose domicile restrictions on employment and social security. On the flip side, the ‘sending States’ are highly motivated to serve their “own people” because they vote in their source villages. This fragmented policy response to internal migration follows from State-specific calculations on what political dividends might be reaped (or lost) by investing fiscal and administrative resources towards migrants. Moreover, development policy in India has bet big on rural development as an antidote to migration. This widespread ‘sedentary bias’ continues to influence policy even though migration is an important pathway for impoverished marginalized rural households to find economic security (and social emancipation).    Second, migrants are a perennially fuzzy category in policy discourse, located inside two larger categories that have long troubled policymakers: the unorganized worker and the urban poor. Even the e-Shram portal, which has made impressive progress in registering unorganized workers, has been unable to accurately distinguish and target migrants. Policy interventions in major urban destinations continue to conflate the urban poor with low-income migrants. Hence, slum development continues as the primary medium for alleviating migrant concerns, while in reality, most migrants live on worksites that are entirely out of the policy gaze. There seems to be an implicit assumption in the policy circles: if we cannot solve the problems of informality, how can we help migrants? Further, it is assumed that migrants will be automatically catered to with the formalization of the economy, the labour market, the housing market, finance and so on. The pushes the timeline for addressing the migrant issue far out. It is no longer an urgent priority. Gaps in the data Third, migration policy discourse is seemingly paralyzed by the now well-acknowledged failure of official datasets to capture the actual scale and the frequency of internal migration in India. Data systems designed to periodically record only one spatial location have posed great challenges to welfare delivery for up to 500 million people who are part of multi-locational migrant households. The novel corona virus pandemic has placed a sharp focus on problems such as educating and vaccinating those children who accompany their migrant parents, or ensuring that migrant women avail maternity benefits at multiple locations.    Policy in India often emerges from the ground up, taking decades to cement into national law and standard practice. We have seen this in education and food security. In migration too, despite the structural constraints outlined above, it is heartening to see many initiatives on the ground that have immense potential to influence strategic shifts in migration policy. For example, many States have initiated data projects that can track migrants and generate dynamic real-time data that aid welfare delivery. Maharashtra's Migration Tracking System (MTS), which focuses on women and children has been successfully piloted in five districts. Chhattisgarh’s State Migrant Workers Policy is premised on registering migrant workers at source and tracking them through phone-based outreach system.     In States, a heightened awareness about migrants’ issues is locating initiatives in departments other than labour, which has traditionally been the nodal department for migrant welfare. For example, Maharashtra’s MTS is located within the Women and Child Development Department. However, there is further need for multisectoral approaches underpinned by a strategic convergence across government departments and initiatives. Odisha’s Planning and Convergence Department, which offers an institutional mechanism for inter-departmental coordination, is one possible model. The Centre has a lead role In this scenario of well-meaning but scattered experimentation, migrants would be well served if the Centre played a proactive role by offering strategic policy guidance and a platform for inter-State coordination. State-level political economy constraints make the Centre’s role particularly crucial in addressing issues of inter-State migrant workers at ‘destination States’. The NITI Aayog’s Draft Policy on Migrant Workers is a positive step forward in articulating policy priorities and indication suitable institutional frameworks, and deserves a speedy release.    At a time when economic recovery and inclusive growth are urgent policy goals, migration policy can hardly afford to gestate. Strategic initiatives to provide migrates safety nets regardless of location as well as bolster their ability to migrate safely and affordably must keep up the momentum towards migrant-supportive policy.