THE HINDU EDITORIAL – APRIL 5, 2022
Imran Khan’s moves to cling to power
betray his contempt for parliamentary procedures It was certain
that Imran Khan, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, would be ousted in the no-trust
vote. The Opposition had put up a united face. His allies had jumped ship,
reducing the ruling coalition to a minority. His party lawmakers had revolted
against him. The cricketer turned-PM’s defeat was a matter of formality in a
country where no Prime Minister has completed their term. On Sunday, the
Deputy Speaker dismissed the no-trust motion, calling it against the
Constitution, which was followed by Mr. Khan’s formal request to the
President to dissolve the National Assembly. Pakistan will have to hold
elections in three months, provided there is no judicial intervention. There
were three bad options before Mr. Khan: resignation, no-trust vote or early
elections. By choosing elections, he avoided a humiliating defeat and also
sought to torpedo the Opposition’s bid to form a government for the remainder
of the current Parliament’s term. Before the National Assembly convened, Mr.
Khan had set the campaign pitch by accusing the Opposition of conspiring with
a foreign power (an indirect reference to the U.S.) to unseat him. The
current crisis would also allow him to play the victim of some foreign
conspiracy and seek a fresh mandate. But the question is what price does Pakistan
pay for his political manoeuvring? The conspiracy theories, the dismissal of
the no-trust motion and the call for early elections all suggest Mr. Khan’s
contempt for parliamentary procedures and basic democratic decency. For the labyrinth he is in today, Mr. Khan
has to blame nobody but himself. Having been a political underdog for years,
he broke into Pakistan’s two-party political order in 2018 with the direct
support of the military. His cocktail of religious conservatism, nationalism
and anti-corruption crusade promised to build a ‘Naya Pakistan’. But while in
power, he made three critical mistakes: mismanagement of the economy,
mismanagement of his ties with the military and full-spectrum hostility with
the Opposition. His vindictive approach towards the Opposition brought
together all the major Opposition parties, which tried to cash in on the
growing public resentment amid economic woes. Cracks in the government’s
relationship with the military began appearing last year when Mr. Khan reportedly
sparred with the establishment over the appointment of the new ISI chief. His
visit to Moscow in February, immediately after Russia’s Ukraine invasion and
the “neutral” policy his government adopted regarding the conflict seem to
have quickened his fall. Last week, the Army chief, General Qamar Javed
Bajwa, spoke against the Russian invasion and re-emphasized the importance of
Pakistan’s ties with the U.S. in a public rebuke of Mr. Khan’s pragmatism.
Now, out of favour with the military, a lost majority in Parliament and faced
with anger amid a worsening economic crisis, the ‘Captain’ does not have any
good options before him. With his back against the wall, what he is doing for
political survival is only weakening Pakistan’s non-military institutions and
subverting its democratic proceedings. A pause to reflect The Government, Bharat Biotech should
strive for better communication on vaccine safety The World Health
Organization’s (WHO) decision to recommend a pause in the supply of Covaxin
for export is worrying. This follows an inspection of the company’s
production facilities between March 14 and 22 that found “deficiencies” in
the process to ensure that the vaccine produced is consistently suitable for
use. Bharat Biotech, the makers of Covaxin, has said it is committed to
addressing these ‘Good Manufacturing Process deficiencies’ and developing a
“corrective and preventive” action plan that it will submit to the Drugs
Controller General of India (DCGI). WHOO has told countries that for now they
should “consider” alternative vaccines but it has also said that the data
available with it suggest that Covaxin is safe and effective. The details of
these lacunae are not public but Bharat Biotech has said that sophisticated equipment
needed to “enhance the process stringency” were unavailable during the
COVID-19 pandemic. This is not the first time that Bharat Biotech has tangled
with WHO. The global body sought information at least nine times from the
Hyderabad company before approving it to be a global supplier of Covaxin. In
March 2021, the Brazilian health regulator, Anvisa, pointed to several
problems with Bharat Biotech’s manufacturing plant ahead of an agreement by
the company to sell 20 million doses of the vaccine to Brazil. This deal was
ultimately terminated, but there has never been clear communication either by
Bharat Biotech or the DCGI on the concerns raised by the Brazilian health
body. While India is no stranger to making and
supplying billions of vaccine doses, it has historically done so with the
benefit of time. The pandemic saw pulling out all the stops and the balance
between safety and speed tilting towards the latter by both drug regulators,
under pressure from their governments, and vaccine manufacturers, for whom
gargantuan demand promised a financial windfall. Other companies,
internationally too, have made mistakes in supply. AstraZeneca mistakenly
supplied some volunteers who were being tested with the Oxford vaccine with
half the required dose that led to surprising results. This was not disclosed
until much after the trial results were made public and experts openly
questioned the efficacy results. The defining characteristic of a vaccine is
its safety profile and its acceptability is premised on its makers and the
regulators being transparent about it at all times. Both the Government and
Bharat Biotech should strive for better public communication on these fronts. |
The road to Ukraine peace runs through Delhi Mediation is certainly feasible and
India is well positioned to act as a ‘Vishwa-Guru’ between Russia and the
West UTKARSH LEO & FAIZAN MUSTAFA Nearly 40 days
ago, Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in violation
of international law and its security assurances under the Budapest
Memorandum, 1994. And, there are no winners in sight. Despite peace talks
held on March 29, in Istanbul (Turkey), direct negotiations between the
conflicting parties have failed to make much progress: a ceasefire is yet to
be achieved, and the Russian attacks on the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine
continue. As a result, there have been 3,455 civilian casualties recorded in
Ukraine (1,417 killed and 2,038 injured) while more than four million people
have fled seeking protection, safety and assistance. Similarly, in addition to causalities on
the Russian side, financial and economic sanctions imposed by the European
Union and the G7 have impacted the Russian economy. Despite artificial
measures to prop up the rouble, the economy is tanking, annual inflation has
jumped to 15.6%, the Russian Central Bank’s forex reserves remain frozen and
it cannot access financing and loans from multilateral institutions. At the
global level, this war is disrupting supply chins and is causing the fuel and
food prices to surge. This begs the question – if this unnecessary war has
resulted in a no-win situation, why have negotiations failed to end it? Positions versus interests Past
negotiations, by video conferencing or as peace talks (held in Belarus and
Turkey) have failed to make much progress because the parties have been
negotiating over ‘positions’ rather than ‘interests’. A ‘position’ is a
surface statement of what a party wants; for example, Russia’s demand that
Ukraine recognizes the separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk as
independent states. Whereas, ‘interests’ are the underlying reasons behind
those position; for instance, why is Russia focused on the independence of
these separatist areas? Therefore, mediation as a conflicts resolution tool
can assist the parties in identifying these hidden ‘interests’ and facilitate
them in working towards crafting a solution that each of the parties would
value – a Europe of common security and prosperity where the sovereignty of
all nations (Ukraine, Russia and the West) are guaranteed. Mediation (or assisted negotiation) is a
flexible conflict resolution tool facilitated by a neutral third party.
Depending on the choice of parties, it can be facilitative or evaluative and
can be conducted in joint sessions or caucuses (i.e., private meetings).
Additionally, its focus on collaborative bargaining producing a win-win
outcome (in contrast to adversarial proceedings such as arbitration or
litigation that result in a win-loss outcome) equips it to handle conflicts
of all kinds: from workplace disputes to broken contracts to international
conflicts. International mediation follows this process of “assisting two or
more contending parties to find a solution without resorting to force”. Due
to its immense potential, the Charter of the United Nations under Article 33
recognises the promise of international mediation for peaceful resolution of
international disputes. Brokering peace Throughout
history, individuals, countries and organizations (such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross) have acted as third parties and have brokered
peace between conflicting nations. Described by theorists as a form of power
brokerage or a political problem solving process, international mediation has
been used to resolve conflicts for hundreds of years. The best known example
is of U.S. President Jimmy Carter who mediated peace between Israel and Egypt
(known as the Camp David Accords of 1978) that has resulted in 44 years of
peace. Scholarship on neuroscience proves that
emotions have a significant influence on cognitive processes (Kragel and
LaBar 2016). If emotions are running high between conflicting parties it is
very likely that either or both parties get re-active (i.e., to act without
thinking). Ambrose Bierce wrote: “speak when you are angry and you will make
the best speech you will ever regret’. This is where a neutral third party
can act as a ;go-between’ (termed: shuttle diplomacy) to gather more
information and help the parties identify their hidden interests. This helps
in ensuring that conflicting parties keep their eyes on the prize. More
importantly, the mediator shutting between parties helps in limiting or
reducing re-active devaluation – a cognitive barrier where the disputants
wrongfully construe the conflict as a zero sum game. As a result, even the
value of a genuine offer coming directly from an adversary is automatically
reduced in the eyes of the receiver. Therefore, subject to context and the
consent of parties, the mediator can either play a passive role to facilitate
communication or a more active role and exert more influence on the content
of the discussion and the final solution. Focusing on the priority Certainly,
international mediation has a lot to offer. But is it the right choice in the
Russia-Ukraine conflict? Despite bilateral peace talks Russian air
strikes continue on Ukrainian cities resulting in civilian casualties. The
voice against dictatorships will want to hold the Russian President Vladimir
Putin guilty of violation the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional
protocols. It may appear that opting for mediation legitimizes past
violations of international law and civilian killings. Or does it even amount
to trading justice for peace? The answer is a bit more complicated. Mediation
is a tool that avoids ‘being re-active’. More importantly, it helps focus on
the number one priority, i.e., the safety of the Ukrainian people through a
complete ceasefire. Furthermore, a mediator’s skill of strategic empathy
(also a tool of statecraft) will further help understand Mr. Putin’s
underlying drivers and constraints. Furthermore, scholars like Zartman (1981)
have argued that power parity between disputing parties is pivotal to the
success of internation mediation. Indeed, there exists a huge power imbalance
between Russia and Ukraine – Russia commands the world’s second most powerful
military, whereas Ukraine, a nation of rightly 44 million people, was relying
on the pinky promises (or security assurance) made by Russia in the Budapest
Memorandum. However, U.S. President joe Biden’s strategy of making American
intelligence (about Russia’s intention to invade Ukraine under false
pretexts) publicly accessible, equipped Ukraine with the ‘power of
solidarity’ which balanced or even tipped the scale in its favour. As a result,
Russia is cornered, Ukraine has the solidarity of the world, Germany shed its
pacifism and took a harsher stand against Russia by halting the Nord Stream 2
project, and Finland and Sweden are being pushed closer to NATO membership…
Thus, opting for mediation is the only way left for Russia to save face and
escape the sanctions that have crippled its economy. For the West, going ahead with mediation
presents itself as an opportunity to build a Europe of common security,
common prosperity and peace. Simply put, this could be a starting point to
include Russia in the security infrastructure of Europe (like it did with
East Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989) – an opportunity that
was missed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. India fits the bill Mediation is
certainly feasible between Russia and Ukraine because there exists a
willingness to talk. But for this to commence, the approval of the parties
concerned will be crucial. Much depends on the identity of the mediator. With
the recent diplomatic visits to India, by the U.S. Deputy National Security
Adviser for International Economics, the British Secretary of State for
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and Minister for Women and
Equalities, and the Russia Foreign Minister, shows that the world expects
India to play a more active role in the Ukrainian crisis. This is India’s golden chance to establish
itself as a global power. More importantly, plying mediator in this dispute
is in India’s long term interest in countering the China threat – especially
with a growing “no limits” partnership between Russia and China. Moreover,
with the rise of China and its belligerence, its relationship with the West
has soured. As a result, the U.S. and its allies need India as a strategic
partner to balance the rise of China in the Indo-Pacific; it is for this
reason, that India is now a member of the Quad. For now, India is right is not taking
sides. Its relationship with the then-Soviet Union was forged to balance
against-China (as the U.S. was cosying up to China). But with the Ukraine
invasion and western sanctions, Russia is now more dependent on China. Hence,
if India wants the best of both worlds, it must step up and live up to its
claim of becoming a ‘Vishwa-Guru’ (or world leader). Push the policy needle forward on migrant support Amidst scattered experimentation now,
the Centre must offer strategic policy guidance for inter-State coordination MUKTA NAIK & VARUN AGGARWAL Only two years
ago, in the wake of a nationwide lockdown, India was left shocked by the
plight of migrant workers walking hundreds of kilometers, facing hunger,
exhaustion and violence, to get to the safety of their home villages. The
dire circumstances of the migrants tugged at our collective heartstrings.
They became the focus of large-scale relief efforts by governments and civil
society alike. The Government ramped up the One Nation One Ration Card
(ONORC) project, announced the Affordable Rental Housing Complexes (ARHC)
scheme, set up the e-Shram portal and began to draft a migration policy.
These initiatives generated hope that the migrant crisis of 2020 would be a
turning point, setting India firmly on a policy path by offering adequate
citizenship and the accompanying social, economic and political rights to
internal migrants. Still a tale of distress Two years on,
migrant distress has disappeared from our television screens but continues to
be a lived reality. Repeated surveys have found that the incomes of migrant
households levels, even after returning to cities. Migrants are finding less
work and their children eating less. The post-1991 poverty alleviation of
almost 300 million Indians, driven by migration out of farm work, is being
undone. Despite this, cohesive migration policy guidance remains elusive.
Instead, disconnected policy initiatives and technocratic fixes chase
specific agendas while nativism re-asserts itself through domicile quotas and
reservations. The agenda of migrant inclusion has been pushed to periphery of
our collective consciousness. This is not something India can afford to
precipitate. Today, a third of the nation’s workforce is mobile. Migrants
fuel critical sectors such as manufacturing, constructions, hospitality, logistics
and commercial agriculture. Despite clear economic and humanitarian reasoning
to bring migrants back into the policy discourse, the current policy scenario
is at best fragmented and at worst waning. To course correct, we must
recognise the entrenched structural constraints slowing the migration policy
momentum and take strategic steps to push the policy needle forward. A politicized phenomenon First, we must
recognise that migration is a highly politicized phenomenon in India. States
are highly influenced by the political economy of migration. ‘Destination
States’ experience a tension between economic needs, which require migrant
labour, and political needs, which promote nativist policies that impose
domicile restrictions on employment and social security. On the flip side,
the ‘sending States’ are highly motivated to serve their “own people” because
they vote in their source villages. This fragmented policy response to
internal migration follows from State-specific calculations on what political
dividends might be reaped (or lost) by investing fiscal and administrative
resources towards migrants. Moreover, development policy in India has bet big
on rural development as an antidote to migration. This widespread ‘sedentary
bias’ continues to influence policy even though migration is an important
pathway for impoverished marginalized rural households to find economic
security (and social emancipation). Second, migrants are a perennially fuzzy
category in policy discourse, located inside two larger categories that have
long troubled policymakers: the unorganized worker and the urban poor. Even
the e-Shram portal, which has made impressive progress in registering
unorganized workers, has been unable to accurately distinguish and target
migrants. Policy interventions in major urban destinations continue to
conflate the urban poor with low-income migrants. Hence, slum development
continues as the primary medium for alleviating migrant concerns, while in
reality, most migrants live on worksites that are entirely out of the policy
gaze. There seems to be an implicit assumption in the policy circles: if we
cannot solve the problems of informality, how can we help migrants? Further,
it is assumed that migrants will be automatically catered to with the
formalization of the economy, the labour market, the housing market, finance
and so on. The pushes the timeline for addressing the migrant issue far out.
It is no longer an urgent priority. Gaps in the data Third, migration
policy discourse is seemingly paralyzed by the now well-acknowledged failure
of official datasets to capture the actual scale and the frequency of
internal migration in India. Data systems designed to periodically record
only one spatial location have posed great challenges to welfare delivery for
up to 500 million people who are part of multi-locational migrant households.
The novel corona virus pandemic has placed a sharp focus on problems such as
educating and vaccinating those children who accompany their migrant parents,
or ensuring that migrant women avail maternity benefits at multiple
locations. Policy in India often emerges from the
ground up, taking decades to cement into national law and standard practice.
We have seen this in education and food security. In migration too, despite
the structural constraints outlined above, it is heartening to see many
initiatives on the ground that have immense potential to influence strategic
shifts in migration policy. For example, many States have initiated data
projects that can track migrants and generate dynamic real-time data that aid
welfare delivery. Maharashtra's Migration Tracking System (MTS), which focuses
on women and children has been successfully piloted in five districts.
Chhattisgarh’s State Migrant Workers Policy is premised on registering migrant
workers at source and tracking them through phone-based outreach system. In States, a heightened awareness about
migrants’ issues is locating initiatives in departments other than labour,
which has traditionally been the nodal department for migrant welfare. For
example, Maharashtra’s MTS is located within the Women and Child Development
Department. However, there is further need for multisectoral approaches
underpinned by a strategic convergence across government departments and
initiatives. Odisha’s Planning and Convergence Department, which offers an
institutional mechanism for inter-departmental coordination, is one possible
model. The Centre has a lead role In this scenario
of well-meaning but scattered experimentation, migrants would be well served
if the Centre played a proactive role by offering strategic policy guidance
and a platform for inter-State coordination. State-level political economy
constraints make the Centre’s role particularly crucial in addressing issues
of inter-State migrant workers at ‘destination States’. The NITI Aayog’s
Draft Policy on Migrant Workers is a positive step forward in articulating
policy priorities and indication suitable institutional frameworks, and
deserves a speedy release. At a time when economic recovery and inclusive
growth are urgent policy goals, migration policy can hardly afford to
gestate. Strategic initiatives to provide migrates safety nets regardless of
location as well as bolster their ability to migrate safely and affordably
must keep up the momentum towards migrant-supportive policy. |