THE HINDU EDITORIAL- MARCH, 30, 2022

 

THE HINDU EDITORIAL- MARCH, 30, 2022

 

 

Without sufficient cause Unwarranted arrests at behest of majoritarian outfits dent the country’s image The recent arrest of a 25-year-old Muslim woman at Mudhol in Bagalkot district of Karnataka for an innocuous message on Pakistan’s Republic Day is yet another instance of the perverse misuse of the law by authorities. If it was the provision relating to sedition that was invoked mindlessly in the past, including once for a play enacted by primary schoolchildren, the latest one involves an alleged attempt at creating enmity among different groups. Kuthma Sheikh was granted bail on the same day of her arrest, but the incident is no less disconcerting as it indicates the ease with which members of the minority community can be arrested without sufficient cause, often at the behest of overzealous activists with a disproportionate clout in the Administration. In this case, the madrassa student had said, “May God bless every nation with peace, unity and harmony” on March 23, but a local Hindu activist complained to the police that she was creating enmity among communities by wishing people on Pakistan Day. With unsurprising promptitude, the police booked her under penal sections relating to promoting enmity between different groups. As to how her wishes would have attracted wither Section 153A or 505(2) of the IPC is something only the police can explain. The district police have claimed that the arrest was aimed at preserving peace and maintaining order, but it is quite apparent that they acted in a cavalier manner without ascertaining whether there was any substance in the complaint.     Ever since a controversy broke out over girl students wearing the hijab, there seems to be a tendency among right-wing groups to foment trouble targeted at Muslims. These groups have called for a ban on Muslim traders and vendors doing business as part of temple fairs. Even though the State government is citing a law that prohibits non-Hindus from getting property in the vicinity of the temple on lease, it is doubtful whether the rules cover temporary stalls on special occasions. It is regrettable that the State government is not doing enough to stem the impression that its administration is hostile towards minorities. Unwarranted arrests, especially for trivial reasons and on communally motivated complaints, result in unfair incarceration, ruined lives and immensely delayed justice. For a regime that takes strong exception to strident criticism about its human rights and religious tolerance record, the Union government should be equally concerned about the possible damage that such incidents may cause to its global image. The Centre may not have anything to do with law and order, but it may have to advise certain States to restrain the police from perfunctory use of the power to arrest to please majoritarian groups and individuals.     Centralizing tests A common test as the sole determinant of merit for admission is problematic The decision to conduct a Common University Entrance Test (CUET) for admission in undergraduate programmes in all University Grants Commission-funded Central Universities (CUs) from 2022-23 has triggered concerns. No doubt, the proposal is influenced by the National Education Policy, which advocates common entrance examinations by the National Testing Agency for undergraduate and graduate admissions and fellowships. The concept as such is not alien to the CUs. Over a dozen CUs admit students to undergraduate programmers using Central Universities Common Entrance Test (CUCET) scores. The proposed CUET, in 13 languages, seeks to make it mandatory for 45 CUs – there are 54 such institutions – to conduct admissions using a single national level test score. This would spare aspirants from taking multiple entrance tests and also eliminate unfair advantage gained from disproportionate scores in class XII. Critics are evidently viewing this development through the prism of the Narendra Modi government’s obsession with pushing the ‘one nation, one standard’ maxim in different sectors. But as early as 1984, the Madhuri R. Shah Committee, looking into the working of CUs, recommended a national merit examination. In the instant case, the UGC has clarified the existing scheme of reservations in individual universities would not be disturbed.     Yet, the CUET may not qualify as a wholesome determinant of merit given the educational and regional disparities in India. While a vast majority study in State Boards, the test would be based on the NCERT syllabus, followed largely in CBSE schools. The policy limits the Class XII marks as a qualification benchmark and not a co-determinant of merit. With the test being introduced just ahead of an admission season, students, whose learning process was disrupted by COVID-19, may find it challenging. Education Ministers from Tamil Nadu, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh have flagged some legitimate concerns. In the North-east, the argument about the test possibly affecting the interest of State domiciles to secure admission in a university in the region cannot be ignored. There are genuine apprehensions about CUET serving as a precursor to introducing a nationwide entrance test for all undergraduate courses – the UGC has said all institutions are free to use the test scores for admissions. It has been sufficiently demonstrated that common entrance tests spawn the coaching industry and induce cost-heavy hybrid courses from class VI onwards, creating a divide between the haves and have-nots. The country has miles to go in enabling access to entry-level higher education and bridging the gender and economic gap in its university portals. In such circumstances, it needs to be dispassionately examined if prescribing a single entrance test as a sole determinant of merit, either for CUs or for the higher education system as a whole, is pragmatic.

What is wrong with saffronising education The Vice-President of India arguing for an overhaul of the Macaulay system of education is fine, but there are challenges PETER RONALD DESOUZA The short answer to the question ‘what is wrong with saffronising education?’ is ‘really nothing… well… except that…’    In his address earlier this month at the inauguration of the South Asian Institute of Peace and Reconciliation, on the Dev Sanskriti Vishwavidyalaya campus in Haridwar, Uttarakhand, the Vice-President of India, M. Venkaiah Naidu, argued for a major overhaul of the Macaulay system of education which he rightly observed is both dominant in, and damaging to, India. It produces in us a sense of inferiority, replaces our traditional education in the bhashas with the alien curricula of the English, gives us a colonial mindset, makes us ignorant of our heritage and, most of all, and disconnects us from the rich body of ideas and philosophies that constitute our ancient civilization. A resonance earlier In making this claim, Mr. Venkaiah Naidu has joined a stellar list of public persons who, over the decades, have made a similar argument. Rabindranath Tagore, a moving force of the National Education Movement in the early 1900s, fashioned an innovative nationalist curriculum in Visva Bharati, the great university he established. Eminent Indians such as Amartya Sen, Satyajit Ray, and Mahasweta Devi were educated there. Further, K.C. Bhattacharya in his seminal lecture (October 1931), ‘Swaraj in Ideas’, also spoke of the enslavement of our minds by western education which produced ‘shadow minds’ instead of ‘real minds’. This had to be overcome. Abu-ur-Rashid Moulvi, even earlier in 188, in the Asiatic Quarterly Review, argued for higher education in Punjab to be delinked from Calcutta University because the university was exhibiting an ‘anglicizing tendency’ which would lead to the ‘denationalization of the younger generation of Punjabis’. The creation of Punjab University, he hoped, would resist such Anglicization since the literatures and sciences would now be taught in the ‘vernaculars and classical languages’. Arguing for an Indian system of education has, therefore, been an important part of the public debate in India for over a century. Mr. Venkaiah Naidu was not the first. But he is in good company.     He is right when he ascribes to the Macaulay system the production of a sense of inferiority among us Indians. This is an idea common to other anti-colonial thinkers such as Aime Cessaire and Frantz fanon. He is also right when he warns against us becoming ‘mental cripples’, to use Tagore’s term, because we imitate alien ideas and adopt them uncritically. His case of the Macaulay system producing ‘amnesia and erasure’ is also persuasive as is the fear of ‘denationalization’, an idea spoused by T.B. Cunha when he argued against Portuguese colonialism. However, for us not to see Mr. Venkaiah Naidu’s address as him to give us a road map of how to decolonize this Macaulay system, make it more Indian. Honest saffronisation would primarily require sincerity of intent since it would confront many conundrums and challenges along the way. Let me indicate just a few. An inclusive list Let me begin with the first challenge. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, whose knowledge of the depth and the quality of Indian civilization is second to none (for which he was appointed as the spalding professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics at Oxford University), recommended in chapter eight of the 1949 report of the University Education Commission (he was Chairman), that religious education (call it saffronisation) be introduced in our universities. He suggested that the class day begin with a few minutes of silent meditation and that students in the first-year degree course be introduced to the lives of great thinkers such as ‘Gautama the Buddha, Confucius, Zoroaster, Socrates, Jesus, Somkara, Ramanuja, Madhava, Mohammad, Kabir, Nanak, Gandhi’. This is Dr. Radhakrishanan’s own list.  It is very inclusive and shows the openness of his curious mind. By including the founders of major religions in his list, Radhakrishnan was affirming their value for an Indian education. Would Mr. Venkaiah Naidu’s saffronisation be similarly open-minded? About diverse narratives His inclusive list leads to the larger question that saffronisation would have to address. Call it the second challenge. It would need to decide which themes and topics should be included and which excluded in such a saffron education. For example would A.K. Ramanujan’s essay ‘Three Hundred Ramayanas’ be included? If one really wants to overcome the amnesia of a Macaulay education, as Mr. Venkaiah Naidu suggests, to ‘feel proud of our heritage’, then Ramanujan’s essay would have to be included. Ramanujan’s scholarship on the folk tales of India, just like Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, has few equals. His essay celebrates the rich performative and narrative practices of the living epic, the Ramayana. Would saffronisation accept this diversity of narratives? Would it smile at the idea, in one of the performances he describes, of Sita berating Ram who was advising her not to come to the forest, by asking him whether he has seen any performances where Sita does not accompany Ram? Is such philosophical playfulness allowed, if not encouraged? How we answer this important question of inclusion will depend on how we position ourselves on India’s cultural diversity.     This leads to the third challenge. Would the model for recovery and reconstruction of India’s ancient culture, which is what saffronisation does, be that of Dinanath Batra who in a long letter to Smriti Irani, when she was HRD (Education) Minister, set it out, or would it be that of D.P. Chattopadhyaya’s Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture (PHISPC) which has already published several volumes of India’s intellectual achievements? The former espouses Vidya Bharati’s project of cultural assimilation, a thin but toxic agenda, while the latter is a substantive philosophical response to Macaulay, who, had he read the PHISPC volumes would not have the temerity to write, in his 1835 ‘Minute on Education’, that a ‘single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia’. On Indianisation So does Mr. Venkaiah Naidu’s saffronisation side with Dinanath Batra or D.P. Chattopadhyaya? If by saffronisation Mr. Venkaiah Naidu really means Indianisation, it would include both the orthodox and the heterodox traditions of India, the Brahmanical schools and their Buddhist and Jaina challenges. It would include the great architectural practices of the Mughals well as the Sufi and Bhakti movements.    Here, Indianisation would have many colours besides saffron. Moving to science Moving from the humanities and social sciences, to the STEM educational stream, i.e., Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics, then what would Indianisation entail? Would it just involve the simple task of translating the best science textbooks of the world into the various Indian languages, as they do in Japan, since scientific knowledge is universal? Or would it mean advocating some crazy theories as those propounded at the 106th Indian Science Congress in January 2019 where, it was claimed, that we in India were making test tube babies thousands of years ago and that Albert Einstein did not understand relativity. Indianisation must decide if science is only a western product, or is universal. Is Mr. Venkaiah Naidu suggesting that there is a distinctive Indian science? After all this STEM proficiency in India, a product of Macaulay’s system of education has produced the Nadellas and Pichais of the world. Or am I holding the wrong STEM?     And, finally, the paradox. Does saffronisation endorse the decision of the vice-chancellor to permanently station a Central Industrial Security Force camp inside Visva Bharati, the only university in India that has established a nationalist curriculum? The vice-chancellor did this because of student protests. The Government of India supported him. If his conception of saffronisation endorses this decision then, sad to say, Macaulay has triumphed over Tagore. Macaulay may have designed the system of education for Indian but he was also the author of the Indian Penal Code. We decry Macaulay on education, rightly so, but (sadly) enthusiastically embrace Macaulay on the Indian penal system.     Bridging the bay in quest of a stronger BIMSTEC The grouping has potential as a natural platform for development cooperation in a rapidly changing Indo-Pacific region RAJEEV RANJAN CHATURVEDY Sri Lanka is gearing up to host the Fifth Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Summit, now in its silver jubilee year (the summit is being held in virtual/hybrid mode on March 30, and Sri Lanka is the current BIMSTEC chair). This special occasion makes it imperative for BIMSTEC leaders to reinforce their commitments and efforts in building the momentum of collaborations in the Bay of Bengal region for the security and development of all.    This summit is expected to build the required momentum of collaborations among the member states – Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand – as there has been commendable teamwork among them and a finalization of several agreements to enhance regional strategic and economic integration. The unique ecology of BIMSTEC is witnessing enriched political support and commitment from India.    Undoubtedly, BIMSTEC has special significance for India in a changing mental map of the region. India has made the Bay of Bengal integral to India’s ‘Neighborhood First’ and ‘Act East’ policies which can accelerate the process of regional integration. BIMSTEC matters for India and the region. An area of importance Finalizing the BIMSTEC Character; BIMSTEC Master Plan for Transport Connectivity; BIMSTEC Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters; BIMSTEC Technology Transfer Facility (TTF); cooperation between diplomatic academies/training institutions; and a template of Memorandum of Association for the future establishment of BIMSTEC centres/entities present signs of optimisms as well as the comeback of the Bay of Bengal as a new economic and strategic space.     Further, the economic and strategic significance of the Bay of Bengal is growing rapidly with a re-emergence of the idea of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region. This notion assumes that the growing economic, geopolitical and security connections between the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions are creating a shared strategic space. The Bay of Bengal is evolving as the centre of the Indo-Pacific region again. The renewed focus has given a new lease of life to the developmental efforts in the region, in particular BIMSTEC.     As the BIMSTEC process turns 25 years, it is all set to make visible progress through advancing concrete cooperation among the member states. They have invested some fresh energy in the last couple of years to make BIMSTEC a valuable institution for regional integration and collaboration. A bridge between Asias BIMSTEC has huge potential as a natural platform for development cooperation in a rapidly changing geopolitical calculus and can leverage its unique position as a pivot in the Indo-Pacific region. There has been tangible progress in BIMSTEC cooperation in several areas that include security, counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, cyber-security and coastal security, and transport connectivity and tourism, among others.     The growing value of BIMSTEC and its attempt to generate synergy through collective efforts by member states can be understood, for three key reasons. First, there is a greater appreciation of BIMSTEC’s potential due to geographical contiguity, abundant natural and human resources, and rich historical linkages and a cultural heritage for promoting deeper cooperation in the region. Indeed, with a changed narrative and approach, the Bay of Bengal has the potential to become the epicenter of the Indo-Pacific idea – a place where the strategic interests of the major powers of East and South Asia intersect. Political support and strong commitment from all member countries are crucial in making BIMSTEC a dynamic and effective regional organization. Need for connectivity Second, BIMSTEC serves as a bridge between two major high-growth centres of Asia – South and Southeast Asia. Connectivity is essential to develop a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable Bay of Bengal region. Therefore, BIMSTEC needs to address two dimensions of connectivity – one, upgrading and dovetailing national connectivity into a regional road map; and two, development of both hard and soft infrastructures.     The BIMSTEC Master Plan for Transport Connectivity will provide the necessary boost to connectivity. There is growing involvement of educational institutions, industries and business chambers through various forums and conclaves which are helping to enhance cooperation in the areas of education, trade and investments, information technology and communication among others. Resisting the temptation to make lofty promises, the BIMSTEC leaders have focused on priority areas through a concrete action plan on time. India’s role Third, the BIMSTEC Secretariat coordinates monitors and facilitates the implementation of BIMSTEC activities and programmes. The leaders must agree to strengthen the institutional capacity of the BIMSTEC Secretariat. Approval of a charter for BIMSTEC during the summit will further augment its visibility and stature in international fora. Likewise, India has implemented its promise to set up a Centre for Bay of Bengal Studies (CBS) at Nalanda University, Bihar for research on art, culture and other subjects related to the Bay of Bengal. The quest for economic growth and the development of the BIMSTEC region can be achieved with single-minded focus and cooperation among the member countries. In this endeavour, India has a key role in accelerating regional cooperation under the BIMSTEC framework and in making it vibrant, stronger and result-oriented.

 

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THE HINDU EDITORIAL- MARCH 25, 2022

 

THE HINDU EDITORIAL- MARCH, 25, 2022

 

 

Sealed justice  SC should lay down the limits of using sealed cover material to adjudicate cases In refusing to entertain ‘sealed covers’ submitted by the government or its agencies, the Supreme Court has made a noteworthy and welcome shift away from this unedifying practice. At least two Benches have spoken out against it. Recently, in the Muzaffarpur shelter home sexual abuse case, Chief Justice N.V. Ramana wondered why even an ‘action taken’ report should be in a ‘sealed cover’ as an aid to adjudication is something to be strongly discouraged and depreciated. However, it gained much respectability in recent years, with contents withheld from lawyers appearing against the government, but being seen by the judges alone. Unfortunately, in some cases, courts have allowed such secret material to determine the outcome. In a recent instance, the Kerala High Court perused confidential intelligence inputs produced in a sealed envelope by the Union government to uphold the validity of orders revoking the broadcasting permission given to Malayalam news channel Media One on the ground of national security. It is quite disconcerting to find that courts can rule in favour of the government without providing an opportunity to the affected parties to know what is being held against them. In this backdrop, it is significant that the Supreme Court has decided that it will examine the issue of ‘sealed cover jurisprudence’ while hearing the channel’s appeal. For now, the apex court has stayed the revocation order and allowed the channel to resume broadcasting.     It is true that the law permits the submission of confidential material to the court in some cases. In addition, courts can order some contents to be kept confidential. The Evidence Act also allows the privilege of non-disclosure of some documents and communications. Even when authorities claim privilege over classified material, they had no objection to judges perusing them to satisfy themselves about the claims. The government usually justifies the submission of secret material directly to the court, citing national security or the purity of an ongoing investigation. Courts have often justified entertaining material not disclosed to the parties by underscoring that it is to satisfy their conscience. However, the practice sometimes has undesirable consequences. It compromises the defence of those accused of some crimes, especially those involving an alleged threat to national security, or money laundering and corruption. Undisclosed material is often used to deny bail; something the apex court criticized the Delhi High Court for doing in a case against former Union Minister P. Chidambaram. It observed that recording a finding based on material kept in a sealed cover was not justified. The main mischief of the ‘sealed cover’ practice lies in the scope it gives the state to avoid deep scrutiny of the need and proportionality of its restrictions on freedom. The time has come for the Supreme Court to determine and circumscribe the circumstances in which confidential government reports, especially those withheld from the other side can be used by courts in adjudication.   Crisis in Sri Lanka India should is facing an economic crisis with long queues in front of petrol stations, steep rise in prices of essential commodities and frequent blackouts. Although the COVID-19 pandemic precipitated a crisis of trade imbalance, the fundamentals of the Sri Lankan economy have always had serious issues. Debt, both domestic and foreign, has been a major problem. Even in February 2020, hardly a few months after Gotabaya Rajapaksa assumed office as President, his elder brother and Prime Minster Mahindra Rajapaksa, during his visit to New Delhi, wanted India to reschedule the loan. Over the last three months, India has provided assistance of $2.4 billion including a $500 million load deferment and $1 billion credit line to enable the supply of essential commodities. Apart from approaching Beijing, Colombo has also sought help from the international Monetary Fund, shedding its earlier reservation of taking help from the agency. As soon as the shortage of certain essential commodities ends, which the government expects before the start of the Sinhala-Tamil New Year (which falls in the middle of April), steps should be taken for economic recovery. Compulsions of electoral politics should not come in the way of tough measures such as restructuring the administration of concessions and subsidies. Mr. Gotabaya Rajapaksa should also use the scheduled meeting with the Tamil political leadership to create a road map on the issue of political devolution and economic development of the war-affected northern and eastern provinces, among the areas badly hit by the current crisis.    Perhaps, Tamil Nadu has already started feeling the impact of the crisis with the reported arrival of 16 persons from Sri Lanka, including six women and seven children, through illegal means. Tamil Nadu was home to nearly three lakh refugees after the anti-Tamil program of 1983. Regardless of the motive of those who have reached Tamil Nadu clandestinely, the authorities, both in India and Sri Lanka, should ensure that the present crisis is not used to step up smuggling activities and trafficking or whip up emotions in both countries. On the contrary, the crisis should be used as an opportunity for New Delhi and Colombo to thrash out a solution to the Palk Bay fisheries dispute, a longstanding irritant in bilateral ties.

The peculiar case of Ladakh’s eastern boundary Atmanirbhar Bharat requires a bold relook at old misconceptions while continuing dialogue MUKUL SANWAL Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is in India and is expected to meet External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. The changed global geopolitical situation is a good time to focus on the peculiar case of Ladakh’s eastern boundary and the unnecessary ongoing conflict. Treaties, usage and custom There has never been a defined boundary in this area because high watershed frameworks do not apply to the parallel ranges in Ladakh, where the topography shaped both its polity and relations with others. Leh was the ‘cross road of high Asia’ where traders exchanged goods by barter. Ladakh translates as the ‘land of high passes’, which defined the limit of its administrative control over trade routes via the Karakoram pass to the north, Demchok to the south and zojila to the west, triangulating the small settled population limited to the Indus Valley, now with India. Grazing grounds in the south were shared with Tibet. The uninhabited soda plains to the east extending over 100 square miles at a height of 17,000 feet, now disputed between India and China, were of no use and not governed by anyone.    Ladakh emerged as a distinct entity with the Treaty of Timosgang in 1684. This treaty established relations between Leh and Lhasa through trade exchanges. With the Treaty of Chushul in 1842, Ladakh and Tibet agreed to Maintain the status quo. The Treaty of Amritsar in 1846 between the East India Company and the State of Kashmir included Ladakh with its eastern boundary undefined, and the focus remained Pashmina trade for making shawls.    After Britain took over governance of India, attention shifted to the northern boundary of Ladakh because of the Russian advance into Central Asia. In 1870, a British Joint Commissioner was posted at Leh, who continued good relations and correspondence with the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Amban at Lhasa and with the Kashmir State. Both India and China have relied on the correspondence and travel accounts, which had a very different purpose, obscuring the reality that the customary boundary was defined only for the limited area under human occupation.    The authoritative ‘Gazetteer of Kashmir and Ladakh’, brought out in 1890, states that from the Karakoram to the head of the Changchenmo valley the boundary with ‘Chinese Tibet” is “quite doubtful’ (the area of the current discussions) and clear only for the area to the south and west which represents actual occupation (currently not disputed). The unoccupied Aksai Chin is described as “neutral territory”, suitable for wheeled transport and where the Chinese built their road. New domestic consensus There has been advance in developing a common understanding, moving from establishing respective claims to recognizing the ground reality. In 1959, experts of both countries, not unexpectedly, further hardened positions as both sides relied selectively on any correspondence or travel record that would justify their already established stand. In 1993, the signing of an Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control brought in diplomats, and the dialogue moved from history to principles. In 2020, the focus shifted to the ground situation and after 15 rounds of talks, the recent joint statement has highlighted continuing the military and diplomatic dialogue and reaching a mutually acceptable resolution of the remaining issues at the earliest for progress in bilateral relations.    Outside this process, Indian diplomats, Army chief Kodendera Subayya General Thimayya earlier and recently former Commanders of the Leh Corps have characterized the Karakoram watershed as a defensible border, to which the Chinese claim line broadly corresponds, leaving the area where earlier no one exercised  control, Aksai Chin, to China. This raises the question why this assertion has been ignored at the political level.    A former Foreign Secretary and Ambassador to China and the U.S. has explained initial decisions as “ineptitude” and the approach as “unrealistic”, arguing that it is necessary to first acknowledge mistakes of the 1950s for moulding a new domestic consensus. For example, following the Seventeen Point Agreement between China and Tibet in June 1951, even as the Chinese moved into Tibet across Aksai Chin, the North-East Frontier Agency was handed over to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) but not Ladakh. Examining this Agreement, the MEA felt it was “reasonable” and inexplicably that India had no use for the Consulate in Kashghar across the northern border of Ladakh. In the India-China Agreement of April 29, 1954, it appears that the reference to passes marking the boundary in the central sector was taken as including the passes in Ladakh assuming recognition of the boundary. This led to new official maps in June 1954 with the MEA deciding on ‘the most favorable line’ in eastern Ladakh. As the Ambassador points out, in Parliament, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru never admitted that the entire boundary was unilaterally defined or even that it was in dispute leading to the notion of “Chinese betrayal” in the public imagination.    The year 1954, not 1962, was the turning point in complicating the situation Unilateral actions in “neutral territory” establishing a strategic road and defining the boundary converted a colonial ambiguity into a dispute, instead of adopting the watershed principle as in the case of the border of all other Himalayan States. The Cold War heightened mistrust, with Pakistan joining the South-east Asia Treaty Organization and the United States’ covert operation with the brother of the Dalai Lama residing in Kalimpong arming Tibetans. Omission and commission The solution lies in the equally unique 70-year-old continuing dialogue despite each side calling the other an aggressor and sporadic military incidents. Instead of claims, the growing confidence of both countries should enable them to acknowledge acts of commission and omission in the 1950s as newly independent ancient civilizations extended overlapping sovereignty in the uninhabited area in Ladakh over which neither had ever exercised control.    In what would be a bold political step, agreement on the watershed boundary following a well-established principle would meet the national security concerns of India and China without bringing in intractable issues of sovereignty.     Time for India to redefine its relationship with Russia It is too risky for New Delhi to pursue vague aims vis-à-vis Moscow at a time of diplomatic and strategic uncertainty VINAY KAURA Russia’s war on Ukraine has decisively shaped international opinion. Indian foreign policy is also going to be affected in a profound manner. The most important question facing Indian diplomacy is how to navigate India’s great power relations in the future. While there has always remained a pro-Russian popular sentiment in India, rooted in Moscow’s support during the Cold War era, particularly against the pro-Pakistani diplomatic activism by powerful Western countries in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), a majority of Indians today seem taken aback by Russia’s misadventure against a sovereign country. Foreign policy conundrum That Ukraine, a former Soviet republic, is moving closer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the hope of membership may be a sufficient reason for Russia to be infuriated, but it is still an insufficient condition for Ukraine to be attacked in violation of all norms of international law. However, India has not directly criticized Moscow’s action. Memories of the historic Indo-Soviet partnership still seem to tip the scales when it comes to India’s vote at the UNSC. Western countries have criticized India’s repeated abstentions at the UNSC on the issue of the Russian invasion, while the Kremlin has praised India for taking an “independent and balanced” position. While India has not cared much about Western criticism of its “independent” approach to foreign policy, it is the Russian angle this time which has come to restrain India’s strategic autonomy.    President Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine has put New Delhi in a foreign policy conundrum that will not disappear soon because Russia’s action has changed the global order. The Western world has imposed unprecedented sanctions against Russia and banned energy imports. New Delhi is concerned about the impact of these sanctions on global finance, energy supplies, and transportation, amid growing signs that they will constrain India’s ability to import Russian oil.    The image of the Russian military might be tarnished now as Russian forces have under-performed in their Ukrainian campaign. Ukraine has been able to hold the Russia forces back for a long time, which can be seen as a moral victory for a weaker nation. Mr. Putin is neither a crafty strategist nor a charismatic hero who has risen from the ashes of the Soviet defeat to lead Russia into a new period of resurgence. His reputation has been severely bruised because a comedian-turned-politician next door has exposed the hollowness of Russia’s military tactics and operational planning. The real strategic challenge China’s blatant attempts to project its rising power as well as Russia’s threats against it’s “near abroad” will continue to test India’s strategic choices. Nevertheless, what must worry India is the fact that Russia will now become increasingly dependent on Chinese support to defend its policies. Mr. Putin may not know what he eventually wants in Ukraine, But he is aware of the ruble collapsing, the punishing sanctions being imposed, and the dire state of the Russian economy. This will push him further into China’s military and economic orbit.    India’s real strategic challenge is surfacing in the Indo-Pacific with the rise of China, as Beijing has consistently sought to expand its zone of military, economic and political influence through the Belt and Road Initiative. Moreover, instead of smoothing the ruffled edges of India’s insecurities, which are rooted in an undefined boundary, China has only aggravated them further. Though India would like the U.S. to continue to focus on China, it is not possible for Washington to ignore Russia’s aggression along NATO’s periphery.     Since the end of the Cold War, Indians have been debating the contours of strategic autonomy. For some, the notion is a re-branding of India’s non-aligned posture during the Cold War. Others say that the doctrine of ‘multi-alignment’ is the 21st century avatar of strategic autonomy as India has been expanding its engagement with all the major powers.     Reality has many dimensions. And in this case, history is relevant. Indian nationalists of various shades still fondly remember which countries were India’s allies during the Cold War and which were not. Former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s advocacy of neutrality in the bloc politics was justified in the pursuit of an independent post-colonial foreign policy. The Soviet Union was seen as a trustworthy partner against Western hegemony. Following the disintegration of the USSR, India joined Russia and China against the unipolarity of the U.S. The purpose of this trilateral initiative was to promote a multi-polar world to constrain the U.S.’s unbridled power and ambition. India was also uncomfortable with the arrogance that defined Western attitudes towards Russia in the immediate post-Cold War period. For some time, this common concern about unipolarity put the three countries on the same path towards mutual cooperation and understanding. Later, Brazil and South Africa were also brought into this coalition. However, it soon became clear that India and China did not see eye to eye. Moreover, India was determined to maintain its partnership with Russia, an important arms supplier. Its ties with the U.S. have also improved significantly since the end of the Cold War. But continuing dependence on Russian weaponry has become India’s strategic headache. An unpredictable Russia Nostalgia cannot be allowed to trump reality. Mr. Putin seems too frozen in old-fashioned grievances against the West to appreciate the value of India’s friendship. Much of New Delhi’s disillusionment stems from a failure to understand not only Mr. Putin’s political thinking, but also Russia’s place in the emerging global order. If it was a nuclear-armed superpower yesterday, Russia seems to be behaving like a nuclear-armed bully today. Under Mr. Putin, Russia is in a state of transition, swinging wildly from one crisis to another. Therefore, it is too risky for India to pursue vague aims vis-à-vis Russia in these uncertain times.    Those in India echoing Russian resentment against the eastward expansion of NATO are reminded by Western analysts that a NATO-Russia Council was formed specifically to alleviate Russia’s concerns, and that Russia was recognized as one of the World’s leading industrial powers through a formal admission into the elite G-7 not on the basis of its industrial might, but to soften its bruised superpower ego. Truth lies somewhere in between, which perhaps explains India’s stance at the UNSC.     Everyone in and around government must think seriously about India’s relations with Russia as the unfolding Ukrainian tragedy has introduced a new era in international relations. Though Moscow has drifted much closer to Beijing, and is sharply critical of India’s engagement with the U.S. and the Quad, India finds it difficult to extend support to Ukraine. Prime Minister Narendra Modi may still personally like Mr. Putin, but he understands that in the halls of global diplomacy, nations have interests which are not determined by personalities alone. It goes without saying that the U.S. is the country most likely to bolster India’s future as a great power.     It is not going to be easy for New Delhi to maintain its balancing act in the future as Washington hardens its position further. It is inevitable that during this time of diplomatic and strategic uncertainty, New Delhi needs to be ready to radically redefine its relationship with Moscow.

 

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THE HINDU EDITORIAL- MARCH, 29, 2022

 

THE HINDU EDITORIAL- MARCH 29, 2022

 

Beleaguered captain Imran khan will find survival as PM difficult now that he is not the Army’s favourite Prime Minister Imran Khan showed on Sunday that the passionate base of his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) remained intact when tens of thousands of people turned up at Islamabad’s Parade Ground to attend his rally. But his long speech also indicated that the cricketer-turned-politician has finally come to terms with the political challenges he is facing. Mr. Khan, who is facing a no-confidence vote in Parliament, used his carefully worded speech to defend the performance of his government, reiterate the PTI’s “Islamic welfarist” ideology, and set the tone for the future political battles. Drawing parallels between himself Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the former Prime Minister who was overthrown in 1977 by General Zia-ul-Haq and later executed, Mr. Khan alleged that there was an international conspiracy against his government. Whether his allegations are true or not, his coalition government is in trouble, surviving on a razor-thin majority in Parliament. At least a dozen lawmakers from his party have revolted against him. Some coalition members have hinted that there could be an early election. Mr. Khan’s invoking of Bhutto’s fate is also seen as veiled criticism of the military establishment. He had been a close ally of the Generals from before the 2018 elections. But the establishment appears to have gone cold on him.     While Mr. Khan has fiercely defended the track record of his government all is not well at the ground level. There is widespread resentment against the government’s handling of the economy, which the Opposition has tried to capture by mobilizing support for the no-trust motion. The crisis is so deep that even government officials are reportedly not paid their salaries on time. On Sunday, Mr. Khan said he would continue his crusade against “white collar crimes”, referring to corruption charges against Opposition leaders. He calls his opponents rodents and has brought dozens of corruption cases against them in the past four years, but none has resulted in a conviction. On the other side, his hard line approach has galvanized the Opposition, including the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and the Pakistan People’s Party, which joined hands with Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam to form the Pakistan Democratic Movement, an umbrella organization whose sole goal is to bring the PTI government down. While crises piled up one after another, Mr. Khan’s approval rating started slipping. According to a Gallup poll in January, Nawaz Sharif, currently living in exile, was 19 points ahead of Mr. Khan in popularity. Whether Mr. Khan survives the no-trust vote or not, his run as a clean anti-corruption crusader with a mission to build ‘Naya Pakistan’ has come to a halt. His political survival would depend on how he is going to adapt himself and the PTI to the new political environment where he faces a united Opposition without the direct assistance of the military establishment.     The power of the man The relevance of movies dealing with toxic masculinity was in evidence at the Oscars Everything from the Power of The Dog winning only one of its 12 nominations to the silent applause and standing ovation for Troy Kotsur’s Best Supporting Actor win in CODA was swept off the table in the face of Will Smith’s altercation with Chris Rock. Smith, who went on to win the Best Actor Award for his role as Richard Williams in King Richard, slapped Rock when the actor and comedian made a ‘joke’ about Smith’s wife, Jada Pinkett Smith’s hair loss. The neo-western, The Power of the Dog, based on Thomas Savage’s eponymous novel, apart from other things, deals with toxic masculinity, which is what the Smith-Rock confrontation was at one level. In other Oscar news, the heart-warming coming-of-age story, CODA directed by Sian Heder won all three awards it was nominated for. Denis Villeneuve’s exquisite adaptation of Frank Herbert’s science fiction classic, Dune, won the maximum awards. Of the 10 nominations, Dune: Part One (as it is titled onscreen), won six. The golden man went to Hans Zimmer’s score, sound, editing, visual effects, and cinematography and production design.     Drive My Car from Japan, co-written and directed by Ryusuke Hamaguchi, had four nominations, which it won ahead of Paolo Sorrentino’s intensely personal The Hand of God from Italy and Bhutan’s Lunana: A Yak in the Classroom. Smith’s fellow nominees for the best actor included Benedict Cumberbatch as the closeted, conflicted rancher in The Power of the Dog, Javier Bardem’s eye-popping turn as Desi Arnaz in Aaron Sorkin’s Being the Ricardos, Andrew Garfield as Jonathan Larson in Lin-Manuel Miranda’s biographical musical Tick, Tick…. Boom! And Denzel Washington as Macbeth in Joel Coen’s black-and-white takes on The Tragedy of Macbeth. Jessica Chastain’s win in the best actress category for The Eyes of Tammy Faye faced some stiff competition from Olivia Colman in Maggie Gyllenhaal’s The Lost Daughter and Kristen Stewart as Lady Diana in Spencer. The supporting actress category was also closely fought with Arana DeBose from West Side Story winning against Jessie Buckley (The Lost Daughter), Judi Dench (Belfast), Kirsten Dunst (The Power of the Dog) and Aunjanue Ellis (King Richard). Paul Thomas Anderson’s delightfully comforting Licorice Pizza was yet another coming-of-age film with a strong presence at the nomination stage, but did not win. While Jane Campion’s best director win for The Power of the Dog follows Chloe Zhao’s win last year for Nomadland, making her the second woman to win in as many years, the Smith-Rock spat proves that there are miles to go before show business could come of age. Bad jokes, like bad cinema, are best ignored and not put down with violence.

The rise of AAP and central question It is still too early to answer whether the party can threaten the BJP-dominant system or contribute to upholding it ASIM ALI Under a Bharatiya Janata Party-dominant system, most political parties have struggled to hold on to, let alone expand their political space. There are only two exceptions. The first is regional parties in the east and the south whose appeals to linguistic identity or sub-nationalism have found a renewed resonance among the electorate. The second exception is the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), a centrist populist party which has matured under the Narendra Modi-era into a party of emerging national prominence.      AAP has done this by skillfully negotiating the opportunities and threats inherent in the BJP-dominant system. It has geared itself to occupy the political space that has opened with the steady discrediting of the Congress party under the Modi era. In the recent Punjab Assembly elections – where it swept to power, winning 92 of 117 seats – it rode the anti-establishment mood that was partly prepared with the unrest over the farm laws bulldozed through by the central government. At the same time, it has sought to neutralize the ideological threat of the BJP by operating within the boundaries set by the BJP’s larger ideological framework. Strategy after 2019 This second strategy was crystallized after its drubbing in the Lok Sabha election of 2019, when it effected a decisive shift in its route to expansion. Before that election, AAP attempted to expand through high-profile attempts at occupying the oppositional space by attacking the central government and the Prime Minister. In the three years since, it has pivoted away from the national arena, focusing instead on localized issues in the pursuit of a gradual State by State strategy.     The focus of this article is to answer one central question: would the rise of AAP threaten the BJP-dominant system or would it contribute to upholding it? The answer cannot quite be straightforward as it depends on the particular strategic positioning of AAP with respect to the BJP-dominant system: a spectrum ranging from acquiescence to disapproval to confrontation. Being a dynamic variable, this strategic positioning would vary with time and context. The only constant is that AAP would seek to take the positioning it calculates to be most advantageous to its rise.      The BJP-dominant system comprises three elements: the ideological dominance of Hindu nationalism; the unparalleled popularity of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and the unchecked power of the central government machinery.      After 2019, AAP has consistently shied away from challenging the BJP on each of these elements. In line with the party’s State-wise strategy, AAP has preferred to take on State-level BJP governments by decrying their corruption and inefficiencies, and presenting its own ‘Delhi model of governance’ as an alternative. Going by the results of the Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Goa Assembly elections (which were held along with the Punjab and Manipur polls), this plan has not worked out well.      It must be borne in mind that AAP’s spectacular triumph in Punjab is, in many respects, an anomaly. It does not in itself prove or disprove the strategic worth of AAP’s positioning in the BJP-dominant system. Punjab was peculiar in it being a State where all the traditional parties were discredited – a dream scenario for AAP. It was also a State where the BJP was not a major player and the central government was highly unpopular. These conditions are unlikely to be replicated in the other States AAP has set its eyes on; therefore, Punjab does not provide a reliable map for future expansion. The next stage for AAP AAP’s next phase of expansion would run through States with a largely bipolar competition between the Congress and the BJP – States such as Himachal Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, and possibly Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan.      To succeed in this terrain, AAP has more to learn from its failures in Goa and Uttarakhand (States with a similar political dynamic) than from its successes in Punjab. And it is these failures, precisely, which has informed the latest tweaking in the AAP’s political strategy, manifested in AAP leader and Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal’s speech in the Delhi Assembly.      AAP has now seemed to modify its strategic positioning in the BJP-dominant system from acquiescence to disapproval. Breaking several self-imposed shibboleths, Mr. Kejriwal underlined a shift in his party’s approach by attacking Mr. Modi personally (with dramatic references to ’56-inch chest’ and even ‘Hitler’); implicitly criticizing the Hindu nationalist propaganda of the BJP represented by the film, The Kashmir Files; and condemning the Centre’s control of independent institutions as reflected in the deferral of the Delhi municipal elections.      Many observers have put down Mr. Kejriwal’s new avatar to AAP’s renewed ambition to fast-track itself into the primary national opposition to take on the BJP, on the back of its electoral victory in Punjab. This would, however, be a misreading of both the rationale and the nature of AAP’s strategic shift.      First, let us come to the rationale. As mentioned earlier, this shift has less to do with the success in Punjab than to the failures in Uttarakhand and Goa. Both these States were marked by high levels of anti-incumbency against the State governments, and AAP expected its alternative model of governance to catapult the party into becoming a major player. In Uttarakhand, specifically, AAP hoped that its centre-right platform (positioning itself between the Congress and the BJP) would help it attract disillusioned voters of the BJP. Yet, in both the States, AAP stopped well short of a double-digit vote-share, failing even to open its account in Uttarakhand. On pro-incumbency One big take away from this round of State elections is that the trend of de-linked State and national elections has been reversed. This trend was reflected in a poor run for the BJP in State elections between 2018 and 2021. However, these elections mark a sharp break, where the popularity of the central government and Mr. Modi buoyed the BJP in all the four States it won. In Uttarakhand and Goa, the pro-incumbency for the central government more than neutralized the high levels of anti-incumbency against the State governments. The result was the BJP romped back home in both the States while largely holding on to its vote-share from the previous elections.      For AAP, this presented two lessons. One, the party’s State-specific strategic against the BJP cannot afford to ignore the larger national appeal of the BJP. In other words, AAP cannot maintain an agnostic stance toward Hindu nationalism and Mr. Modi if BJP voters continue to vote for them over the governance model presented by AAP. And two, AAP’s cautious and limited opposition to the BJP also hurts it from the other end as anti-BJP voters flock toward the more aggressive posture of the Congress. Since both pro-incumbency (Mr. Modi, Hindutva) and anti-incumbency (unemployment, inflation) in State elections increasingly have national provenance, AAP’s localized strategies seem to be missing a larger national element. An outlook Does this mean that AAP is about to resurrect its pre-2019 phase of frontal confrontation with the Modi government, or become part of a broader oppositional alliance against the BJP? The answers are probably in the negative. The party is unlikely to drop its carefully planned State-by-State strategy in favour of another premature dart to occupy the national oppositional space. As a fleet-footed party adept at learning from its mistakes, one would not expect AAP to forget the lessons of the last two general elections in a hurry.      The actions of AAP over the last few years have demonstrated that it has accepted the durability of the BJP-dominant system. The results of the recent State elections would have only reinforced that notion. The long-term strategy of AAP is to replace the Congress as the alternative pole to the BJP. Towards that end, the strategic positioning of AAP in the BJP-dominant system might sway between acquiescence and disapproval. The phase of confrontation with the BJP-dominant system might only come after this long period of, to paraphrase Deng Xiaoping, hiding its strengths and biding its time.       A subregional grouping that must get back on course BIMSTEC is in need of a framework to tackle the specific challenges confronting the Bay of Bengal region VENU RAJAMONY As world attention remains focused on the war in Ukraine, leaders of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) will attend a summit meeting of the regional organization. The meet, which is to be held in virtual mode, will be hosted by Sri Lanka, the current BIMSTEC chair.     Founded in 1997, the seven-member BIMSTEC, which includes the littoral states of India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar (Thailand is a member too) and the land-locked states of Nepal and Bhutan, has identified 14 pillars for special focus. These are trade and investment, transport and communication, energy tourism, technology, fisheries, agriculture, public health, poverty alleviation, counter terrorism and transnational crime, environment and disaster management, people-to-people contact, cultural cooperation and climate change. While each sector is important, the segmented approach has resulted in omnibus end summit communiqués full of aspirations rather than action. The upcoming summit is an opportunity for BIMSTEC leaders to go beyond generalized statements and take concrete steps to address critical challenges confronting the region.      A Bay of Bengal Maritime Dialogue (BOBMD) organized recently by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the Pathfinder Foundation brought together government officials, maritime experts, and representatives of prominent think tanks from Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia. Participants called for stepped up efforts in areas such as environmental protection; scientific research; curtailing illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, as well as the development of standard operating procedures that could govern interaction between fishing vessels of one country with maritime law enforcement agencies of another. Rich marine ecosystem Presentations made at the BOBMD highlighted the fact that the Bay of Bengal is home to a large network of beautiful yet fragile estuaries, mangrove forests of around 15,792 square kilometers, coral reefs of around 8,471 sq.km, sea grass meadows and mass nesting sites of sea turtles. The annual loss of mangrove areas is estimated at 0.4% to 1.7% and coral reefs at 0.7%. It is predicted that the sea level will increase 0.5 metres in the next 50 years. Moreover, there have been 13 cyclonic storms in the last five years. The Bay is an important source of natural resources for a coastal population of approximately 185 million people. The fishermen population alone is estimated to be around 3.7 million, with an annual fish catch of around six million tones, constituting 7% of the World’s catch and valued at around U.S.$4 billion. Around 4,15,000 fishing boats operate in the Bay and it is estimated that 33% of fish stocks are fished unsustainably (source: presentation in February 2022 by E. Vivekanandan, senior consultant, ICAR-Central Marine Fisheries Research institute). According Organization of the United Nation (FAO), the Bay of Bengal is one of IUU fishing hotspots in the Asia-Pacific.      The pressing challenges that confront the Bay of Bengal include the emergence of a dead zone with zero oxygen where no fish survive; leaching of plastic from rivers as well as the Indian Ocean; destruction of natural protection against floods such as mangroves; sea erosion; growing population pressure and industrial growth in the coastal areas and consequently, huge quantities of untreated waste flow. Security threats such as terrorism, piracy and tensions between countries caused by the arrests of fishermen who cross maritime boundaries are additional problems. It also needs to be kept in mind that the problem of fishermen crossing into the territorial waters of neighboring countries affect India and Sri Lanka and Bangladesh and Myanmar (also Pakistan on the west coast). Need for regional interaction The blue economy potential of the Bay of Bengal is huge. There are many opportunities to develop maritime trade, shipping, aquaculture and tourism. However, tapping these opportunities requires coordinated and concerted action by governments, scientists and other experts. The BIMSTEC Summit must create a new regional mechanism for coordinated activities on Maritime issues of a transboundary nature. This mechanism must initiate urgent measures to strengthen fisheries management, promote sustainable fishing methods, establish protected areas and develop frameworks to prevent and manage pollution, especially industrial and agricultural waste as well as oil spills. There is also a need for greater scientific research on the impact of climate change in general and on fisheries in particular.     At present, there is limited cooperation between countries of the region in marine research. Most BIMSTEC countries have premier institutions and excellent scientists but their interaction with the West in far more than within the region. The use of modern technology and improved fishing practices can go a long way in restoring the health of the Bay. This should be a priority area Marine environmental protection must become a priority area for cooperation in the Bay of Bengal. Enforcement must be strengthened and information shared on best practices. Regional protocols need to be developed and guidelines and standards on pollution control established. Decision-making must be based on science and reliable data, information and tools.      There is a need for home-grown solutions based on capabilities of local institutions and for mutual learning through regional success stories. There is a need to create regional frameworks for data collection. Participatory approaches must be evolved for near-real-time stock assessment and the creation of a regional open fisheries data alliance. The Bay of Bengal Programmes (BOBP), an inter-governmental organization based in Chennai, is doing good work to promote sustainable fishing.       A Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem (BOBLME) project is funded by the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and others. The BIMSTEC summit must express full support for both BOBP and BOBLME. The summit must mandate officials to come up with measures to curtail unsustainable as well as IUU fishing. These could include setting up an international vessel tracking system and making it mandatory for vessels to be equipped with automatic identification system (AIS) trackers; establishing a regional fishing vessel registry system and publishing vessel license lists to help identify illegal vessels; increasing monitoring, control and surveillance in IUU fishing hotspot; establishing regional guidelines on how to deter and prevent IUU practices; improving the implementation of joint regional patrols, and regional fishing moratoriums and outreach programmes targeted at fisher-folk. Laws and policies in littoral states must be harmonized and humanitarian treatment of fishermen ensured during any encounter with maritime law enforcement agencies.       The challenges that confront the Bay of Bengal region brook no more delay. BIMSTEC must arise, awake and act before it is too late. The summit must set in process regular meetings of officials, supported by scientists and experts, to tackle illegal and unsustainable fishing as well as prevent the further environmental degradation of the Bay of Bengal.

 

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