THE HINDU EDITORIAL- MARCH, 28,2022

 

THE HINDU EDITORIAL- MARCH 28, 2022

 

Lotus pose Yogi Adityanath is now central to the BJP’s political ambitions for the whole country Yogi Adityanath has become the first Chief Minister in Uttar Pradesh to be sworn in for a second successive term after having completed a full give-year term. Among the 52 others who took oath with Mr. Adityanath on March 25 were Keshav Prasad Maurya and Brajesh Pathak who are deputy Chief Ministers. The composition of the Council of Ministers signifies the continuing efforts of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to balance the claims of various caste groups within the Hindutva umbrella. Several new faces have been added and several others dropped, to infuse the new Ministry with fresh energy and optics. As many as 22 Ministers from the previous term were removed, of whom 11 had lost the elections. Upper castes have got a lion’s share of the berths – 21 of the 52, with the Brahmins and Rajputs in particular, who got seven each. These communities rallied behind the BJP like never before in 2022, forming the core of the Party’s social base. Non-Yadav OBSs that largely stayed with BJP have also been rewarded, though to a lesser extent. Dalit support for the BJP has been acknowledged, with nine of them making it to the Council. The BJP has finally made a serious attempt at wooing the Muslim vote bank by including Danish Azad Ansari, a Pasmanda or backward Muslim. Rising through the ranks of the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, he has been working on the ground to create a connection between Muslims and the BJP.        The BJP hopes that the distribution of power among various social groups effected through the Council’s composition will stand it in good stead ahead of the 2024 Lok Sabha election. The criticality of U.P. in its national plan cannot be overstated – it contributes 20% of the party’s current strength in the Lok Sabha. The party will do everything to keep its U.P. house in order. The central leadership of the BJP had a significant say in the selection of Ministers, But a balancing has been sought with the Chief Minister’s views. Mr. Adityanath has emerged as a leader of his own standing through his first term and this election victory. Controversial as it is, his aggressive style and steamrolling administrative tactics have won him tremendous popularity. He has become a new icon of BJP politics. For good reasons, the 49-year-old is being seen as a potential successor to Mr. Modi who is 71. He is likely to fashion his second term with that view firmly in mind. India’s most populous State is also a severely underdeveloped one. His governance in U.P. can influence the course of the country. Mr. Adityanath’s second term in U.P. will, therefore, be watched beyond the State, and around the world.                                       Talking and listening India and China will find it difficult to simply pick up the threads of their conversation Brief as it was, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Delhi on Friday appears to have left behind more questions than answers on its purpose. The visit was a first by a senior Chinese official since the military standoff along the LAC began in April 2020. Since then, despite 15 rounds of border commander talks and eight rounds of meetings of the special Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC), friction areas remain – including Patrol Point (PP) 15, Demchok and Depsang – where troops have been amassed on both sides. However, it appeared that during his meetings, separately with NSA Ajit Doval, followed by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, Mr. Wang proposed no new mechanism or formulation to break the logjam in those talks, as had been the case earlier. Instead, the Chinese side only repeated that India must put the differences on the border issue “in the proper place in bilateral relations”, and revive bilateral talks on all issues. The suggestion was part of a three-step formula, according to a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement that included taking a long-term, ‘civilizational’ view of India-China ties, seeing each others’ development as a “win-win” and cooperating at multilateral sphere. The last point was a reference to China’s turn to host the BRICS summit later this year, which Mr. Wang hoped Prime Minister Modi would attend, and India’s turn to host the SCO and G-20 summits next year, where Chinese President Xi Jinping would be among the invitees.     However, neither Mr. Wang nor his hosts in the Government answered why, if his message did not differ from the past, he was received in Delhi at all. That he was merely in the region – visiting Pakistan for an OIC conference; Afghanistan to meet with the Taliban ahead of another conference in Beijing, and Nepal to further bilateral cooperation and infrastructure projects – and decided to “drop in” does not seem to suffice as a reason, when bilateral ties remain at a standstill. Nor does it explain why the Modi government, which has consistently said it would only hold bilateral talks about resolving the border standoff, departed from this precept to discuss bilateral and international issues. Neither side announced Mr. Wang’s arrival until the first meetings on Friday, indicating that there is something more behind the scenes. It is also possible that his outreach stems from a desire to compare notes on Ukraine, where India and China find themselves at odds with the western sanctions regime that threatens to isolate Russia and split global transactions into a “dollar vs non-dollar” system, while also finding themselves not entirely comfortable with Mr. Putin’s actions. Regardless of any common understanding on other issues, however, it is clear that New Delhi and Beijing cannot simply pick up the threads of their conversation until there is a full understanding of events since April disengagement of troops, is completed.

The era of an unemployed India    There are many indices of proof that seriously contradict the tall claims of employment generation in India MAYA JOHN Reports on and the visuals of the recent agitations by railway job applicants reveal a widespread problem of massive job insecurity among India’s youth. Alarming figures of unemployment have been recurrent even before the huge dislocation unleashed by lockdowns imposed in 2020-21 in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Much before the pandemic, the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) reported a 6.1% unemployment rate in 2017-18, the worst in over four decades. The picture has proved more dismal in the ensuing months since April-May of 2020.     For instance, in December 2021, the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) estimated that nearly 53 million Indians were unemployed, a large proportion of whom were women. The unemployment rate was hovering at 7.91% in December 2021, and though there has been some talk of a dip in unemployment in January 2022, the figure still stands at a worrying 6.57%. Exposing claims Percentages and data spun out by governmental agencies and policy think-tanks are open to contestation, but there are other indices of proof that seriously contradict the tall claims of employment generation. One such index is the downward pressure unleashed by the influx of overqualified youth aspiring for middle and lower rung government jobs, which, despite their modest pay, are highly coveted given the greater job security ascribed to them.     Expectedly then, having advertised over 35,000 posts, the Railway Recruitment Board was swamped with over 1.25 crore applications; a significant proportion of which were postgraduate degree holders. This created massive insecurity among a section of candidates who met the minimum eligibility but were being forced to compete with candidates having higher educational credentials.      With government jobs being limited, and reducing in number due to the contractualisation and outsourcing of several substantive posts, intense competition persists across various categories of jobs; a point brought to light yet again by the recent Railways’ recruitment controversy. As clarified by the Railway Recruitment Board and Union Railway Minister, for the second stage of testing that stoked protests, the huge number of aspirants for lowest rights up to the highest level of jobs advertised, eventually compelled the authorities to shortlist 20 times the number of candidates for all levels. Explaining the scramble Shockingly, advertisements for even a handful of lower rung government jobs attract an overwhelming number of applications, leading at times to the withdrawal of such advertisements. In September 2021, news reports highlighted that among 18,000 applicants for some 42 posts (peon, gardener and cook) in the Himachal Pradesh secretariat, there were hundreds of doctorate and other postgraduate applicants. Earlier, in March 2021, more than 27,000 candidates with degrees such as BA, BSc, MA, MSc, MCom, MBA, engineering, etc. had applied for 13 positions for a peon’s job in the Panipat district court. Likewise, for 62 posts of messengers in the Uttar Pradesh police, in August 2018, there were a total of 93,000 applicants; 3,700 were PhD holders and 50,000 were graduates, This particular job vacancy required an education level of Class V and the selection criterion comprised a self-declaration that the candidate knew how to ride a bicycle.     The desperate scramble for government jobs stems in no uncertain terms from the high job insecurity (easy hire and fire), poor basic pay, and long hours of work that characterize the bulk of jobs in the private sector. Historically, only a small number of employer-employee work relations in India - associated mostly with the formal sector – have been subject to state regulation. However, in recent decades, there has been a steady decline of state regulation of labour-capital relations in the formal sector. This deregulation has been coupled with a concerted push toward rapid privatization of the public sector. Together, these developments have contributed significantly to periodic unemployment among both skilled and less skilled workforces, in addition to reducing avenues of gainful employment for new entrants in the job market. A spillover effect The ramifications of this overall process are multifold. At one level, enhanced deregulation of employer-employee work relations in the formal sector has triggered periodic unemployment of higher skilled workers, who have been spilling over into and crowding lower-skilled, informal sector jobs. Likewise, the spillover effect of periodic unemployment within middle-rung and higher-rung professional jobs in India’s job market has pushed more qualified youth to crowd lower rung government jobs.      This tendency itself has rendered a deep crisis for those with lower educational qualifications who strive for the more modest government jobs, and for whom such employment has traditionally been envisaged.       Reduced expenditure by the state on health, education and the social sector as a whole has also ensured inadequate employment generations, despite the fact that the demand for ‘public goods’ has been growing exponentially. For a country with growing educational needs, especially with large numbers seeking to escape inherited poverty through avenues opened up by education, the marked shortage of government schools and public-funded universities is alarming to say the least.       A closer look at the higher education sector itself reveals a steady increase in the number of student applicants. The scenario naturally calls for many more job recruitments of qualified teachers through the creation of new public-funded Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) and an expansion of existing ones. However, successive governments continue to restrict and even delay recruitment of teachers to existing public-funded HEIs. For examply, in a large public-funded university such as the University of Delhi, a recruitment crisis has intensified over the years with over 4,500 teaching posts being filled by ad hoc teachers and appointments to permanent positions being stalled repeatedly. Antinomy of eligibility This recruitment crisis is also the result of an inexplicable delay in the grant of the second tranche of teaching positions that was to accompany institutional expansion in the wake of implementation of reservations for Other Backward Classes (OBSs). A recipe for a complete disaster continues to unfold in such universities as a large, highly skilled workforce of serving teachers defensively holds on to insecure temporary job contracts as more eligible fresh candidates enter job market. One of the contentious consequences of such heightened competitions has been the enforcement of higher and higher qualifications for entry-level teaching jobs in public-funded HEIs.      In this way, another index of mounting job insecurity and unemployment is the arbitrary enhancement of educational qualifications stipulated for recruitment into better-paid government jobs, as well as new criteria for admission into professional training institutions. This tendency has not only manifested itself in public-funded HEIs wherein entry-level teaching positions now mandatorily require a PhD degree in addition to a Master’s degree and UGC-NET qualification. It is also evident in the barrage of common entrance tests for highly sought-after educational degrees such as in medicine (National Eligibility cum Entrance Test, or NEET), as well as centralized eligibility tests for recruitment into jobs such as school teaching (Central Teacher Eligibility Test, or CETET). As the number of seats and vacancies fail to be augmented, we see a systematic effort to ruthlessly eliminate a growing number of aspirants using astute tests and arbitrary criteria.      In the backdrop of a large number of skilled and overqualified people languishing in the throes of unemployment, the shrill rhetoric of ‘skill India’ rings hollow. We will see more instances of frustration and agitations by the youth in response to rampant unemployment. For the scores of educated aspiring youth, transcending the prevailing logic of the economy is a crucial starting point for envisaging a world free of unemployment. As economy that creates fewer jobs is one which overworks some while rendering large numbers unemployed. A tired India and an unemployed India are simply two sides to the same coin. The youth realise that their access to the basics – education, health and livelihood –depends on their desperate search for dignified employment. A transformation of circumstances awaits newer sensibilities and a sense of solidarities.     Poverty rose but income inequality fell There are signs that this pandemic has not followed the usual script – of the poor bearing the brunt of the pain ANUP MALANI, ARPIT GUPTA & BARTEK WODA COVID-19 had upended Indian society. Over two-thirds of the country has been infected by COVID-19 and perhaps five million or so people have died, directly or indirectly, from the pandemic. The economy too has taken a beating. Even though there has been a V-shaped recovery, output remains about 19% lower than 2019.      In macroeconomic crises, including the oil shock of 1990-91 or the global liquidity crisis of 2007-08, many expect the poor to bear the brunt of the pain. They are the most vulnerable, without contractual protections and adequate safety nets. But there are signs that this pandemic has not followed that script.     Poverty certainly rose during the COVID-19 pandemic. We examined monthly data from nearly 2,00,000 households with a total of one million members from the Consumer Pyramids Household survey through 2021. We found that extreme poverty, defined by the World Bank as the percentage of the population with an income below $1.90, rose from 7.6% in November 2019 to 11.7% in July 2021. Income inequality However, income inequality actually fell. In 2019, the average monthly income of households in the top 25% and bottom 25% of the income distribution was approximately 45,999 rupees and 8,000 rupees, respectively, in urban areas, and 22,500 rupees and 7,500 rupees, respectively, in rural areas. While the average monthly income of the top quartile in urban areas fell almost 30%, to 32,500 rupees by July 2021, the monthly income of the bottom quartile in July 2021 remained at pre-pandemic levels. In rural areas, the top quartile income fell by perhaps 20%, while the bottom quartile income grew slightly during the same period. The result is that inequality, measured as the percentage change in the income of the top quartile minus the income in the bottom quartile, fell by 15-20 percentage points. This is holds saw larger drops in income all along the income scale, in rural and urban areas, within each State, and even within caste groups.      This remarkable finding is not unprecedented. Historians observed the same dynamic during the plague in 14the century Europe. Given how much the world economy has changed since then, however, the explanations for India’s experience will differ. Three sources of income To learn why inequality fell during the pandemic, we examined three sources of household income: government transfers, business profits and labour income. Government transfers are cash or in-kind payments. Profits may be from any business, be it a food cart, a farm, or a manufacturing plant. Labour income is wages earned from hourly work or employment contracts.      Government payments to the poor cannot explain the decline in inequality. To be sure, income support was not insubstantial. Households received roughly 400 rupees per month in urban areas and nearly 500 rupees per month in rural areas during the lockdown and Delta wave. They received roughly half that much during the rest of the pandemic. However, even when government transfers were netted out from income, income inequality fell by over 20% points by July 2021.       Business profits play a bigger role than transfers. The rich saw a larger decline in business income and depended more on that income than the poor. While just 7% of a bottom quartile household’s income is from a business, nearly 15% of a top quartile’s household’s income is from a business. Unlike labour income, business income is volatile because it is susceptible to changes in demand, and thus to aggregate income. We find that business income of the top quartile is four times more sensitive to the aggregate performance of the economy than the business income of the bottom quartile. Given the large negative effect of COVID-19 on the economy, this suggests that some of the disproportionate losses of the rich operate through business income.       Labour income, however, plays a critical role (Table). Labour income is just over 65% and 80% of the income of the top 25% and bottom 25% of households. These are larger shares than those of government transfers or business profits. To explain the decline in labour income, we looked at supply-side explanations.       Looking at supply, one might suspect the rich chose to work less than the poor, perhaps out of fear of contracting COVID-19. That was also our conjecture, but it proved wrong. When the economy contracted, people lost jobs and income. They tried to compensate by finding alternate work, sometimes even in other occupations. While this seems a natural response for the bottom 25%, it was even more true for the top 25%. While the minimum amount that the poor were willing to accept to take a job fell roughly 40%, the minimum amount fell more than 45% for the rich. Demand for labour The better explanation for the disproportionate loss of labour income among the top quartile households is that demand for their labour fell more. The rich tend to work in the service, and demand for services fell more than demand for other sectors. While 30% of workers in bottom quartile households work in the service sector, 45% of workers from the top quartile households do. During the pandemic, consumer spending on services fell by 30%-40%, far more than the decline in spending on manufacturing or agriculture.       The situation was reversed in manufacturing. That sector employs a larger share of bottom quartile workers than top quartile ones: 35% versus 15%. But manufacturing declined less than 20% during the pandemic. The progressive contraction of demand for services swamped the regressive contraction of demand for manufacturing.       To be clear, our analysis does not suggest that the pandemic was good for the Indian economy. The loss of life and rise in poverty make it one of the larger disasters the country has borne. The reduction in inequality would be a silver lining if it were accomplished by lowering poverty rather than reducing the income of the rich.       Nevertheless, by understanding the decline in inequality during the pandemic we can assess prospects for inequality after it ends. Once demand for services rises, along with aggregate income, both demand for the labour of the rich and the business income of that group will likely return. There is a risk that inequality will return to pre-pandemic levels.