THE HINDU EDITORIAL - APRIL 2, 2022

 

THE HINDU EDITORIAL – APRIL 1, 2022

 

Sri Lanka’s rage President Rajapaksa must acknowledge popular anger and formulate a recovery plan As irate protesters gathered near the house of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa in a desperate bid to highlight their suffering, the worsening economic crisis in Sri Lanka has possibly reached its crescendo. The Rajapaksas, who have dominated the political and electoral scene, face an unprecedented decline in their popularity, as the people struggle for want of adequate money, fuel and food. The roots of the crisis may not lie wholly in the policies of Mr. Gotabaya, who was swept to power in 2019 as President on a platform of strong leadership and decisive action, while his party, the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna, won a landslide in parliamentary elections a year later. The Rajapaksas did inherit some economic problems, while the pandemic cast a greater burden. However, the current administration is indeed responsible for some ill-advised populist measures such as a huge raise in the threshold for income taxes and VAT registration, leading to revenue loss. And there was a questionable order to move to fertilizer-free farming overnight, which led to loss of yield and drew sharp criticism. The chemical fertilizer ban has been rolled back, but its impact on food security remains. Yet, more than anything, what appears to infuriate the people is the perception of governmental apathy towards their plight, of denial of the existence of a crisis and the absence of a road map for economic recovery.    It may be simplistic to summarise the causative factors behind the crisis as excessive borrowings at high interest rates and a putative ‘Chinese debt trap’. However, there is behind it a tale of economic mismanagement, profligate use of public resources, and possible mishandling of monetary policy. Sri Lanka, an island nation heavily dependent on imports, gains its foreign exchange through tourism, the export of garments and tea, besides external remittances. If the Easter Sunday blasts of 2019 set back its tourism sector, the novel corona-virus pandemic almost finished it off. The heavy-handed lockdown, overseen by a military-led task force, had severe economic consequences too, as livelihoods were lost, while earnings suffered. The country needs measures to shore up its foreign exchange reserves and the balance of payment position. India has extended assistance amounting to $2.40 billion, and China is also looking at further loans. The country’s past resistance to borrowing from the IMF may not last, and it may have to accept significant conditionalities for a bailout package. However, advocating that the people tighten their belts and suffer a little more may not work. The President should acknowledge both the depth of the crisis and the rising public disenchantment. What his country needs is empathetic leadership and decisive measures to halt the downward spiral.   Quota and data No group should get exclusive reservation without data on backwardness The Supreme Court has rightly quashed the Tamil Nadu Special Reservation Act of 2021, or the Vaniyar quota law, on the ground that it was not based on updated quantifiable data. The Act had envisaged the distribution of the 20% quota for Most Backward Classes (MBC) and De-notified Communities (DNCs) in education and public employment by assigning 10.5% to Vanniyars or the Vanniyakula Kshatriya community, 7% for 25 MBCs and 68 DNCs, and 2.5% for the remaining 22 MBCs. Even though a superficial look at the law would give an impression that not just the Vanniyars but also 115 other communities have been covered, the aspect of internal reservation for one community – Vanniyars – had created the impression of special treatment. Such treatment per se is not bad in law, as caste, the Court said, can be the starting point for the identification of backward classes or providing internal reservation, though it cannot be the sole basis. Also, there must be pertinent, contemporaneous data. The Court also pointed out that no analysis had been made of the relative backwardness and representation of other communities in the MBCs and DNCs.    The Court’s decision has provided relief to many by holding that the State is competent to design sub-classification among backward classes; prescribe the quantum of reservation based on such sub-classification, and formulate an ancillary law, even with the assent of the Governor, to one included in the Ninth Schedule. Regardless of further moves by the DMK government that had defended the law in the Supreme Court, this episode had important lessons. No community should be allowed internal or exclusive reservation without making a case for it on the bases of quantifiable data. A caste-based census can help in determining the representation of various communities in public employment and in education. After all, it is adequate representation that holds the key for the special treatment of reservation. But whether caste, narrowly defined, and not the socio-economic indicators of the applicants, should be the bases for reservation is another issue. Tamil Nadu’s parties must take a relook at their position against the implementation of creamy layer rule in reservation, as otherwise there will always be demand for internal reservation from communities that feel left out. If the parties believe genuinely in the principle of equity in reservation, they should not have any problem in agreeing to the concept of creamy layer. Also, the demand for reservation will carry on if those seen as economically advanced continue to obtain a larger share of the reservation pie. Other than for the SCs and STs, the creamy layer must be excluded in providing for reservation for castes that qualify as backward classes.

Caste analysis and its reading today There is an apparent opacity of caste now, which requires fine-grained and multi-dimensional study SATISH DESHPANDE Twenty years ago, at the dawn of the new millennium and after the ‘Mandal decade’ of the 1990s, it looked as though the institution of caste had become legible in a new way (See “Caste and social structure”, The Hindu, December 6-7, 2001). The break with the past seemed decisive; a code had been cracked, and caste could be ‘read’ like never before. Like any newly literate person, we took it for granted that the change was permanent.      But the new age of caste clarity lasted barely two decades. Today, in the mid-Modi era after the novel corona-virus pandemic, we are struggling to come to terms with the perception that caste has become opaque again – the code has changed. What has changed? And how has it affected our understanding of caste? The ‘we’ To begin with, the perception of the ‘we’ has changed. It can no longer remain an unmarked universal ‘we’ that speaks for everyone, but must be acknowledged as upper caste. Specifically, this is the vantage point of the overwhelmingly upper caste liberal intelligentsia, a group that certainly has a caste location with its biases, but is more a spectator than a player in the game of caste. Unlike players (who must strategise to win the game while taking account of possible moves by opponents and aliens), the spectator tries to map all possible moves by all players.     The other changes can be divided into two kinds – those that are internal to the caste structure itself and those that are located in the larger context. Leaving the contextual changes for later, the internal changes are taken up here, initially in relation to the largest group the Other Backward Classes (OBCs).                            On the OBC's                                                                                     The re-orientation of caste in the new millennium happened largely because of the arrival of the OBCs on the national stage. The OBCs were good to think with for several reasons. First, the OBCs helped to place caste the right side up. From the Nehru era until the 1990s, the dominant ideology had presented caste as the exception and casteless-ness as the rule. The OBCs forced us to recognize that the upper castes were a minority rather than the ‘general’ or universal category. Second, because they were an intermediate group, the OBCs invited closer attention to the notion of backwardness and the interplay of graded privilege and disprivilege in different caste clusters. Third, because they were defined as a residual category – neither in the Scheduled Castes (SC) or Scheduled Tribes, nor in the upper castes – the OBCs highlighted the pros and cons of categorization and the challenge of internal disparities within large groupings. The OBCs were also important in themselves because of their demographic weight and distribution. They were present in most parts of the country and formed a large (usually largest) segment of every class group, from the poorest to the richest. That is why they had a special affinity for federalism and were instrumental in introducing coalition politics at the national level.     Is this way of reading caste still valid for caste analysis today? The short general answer is yes; but it is the particulars that matter for the more useful long answer. Internal dynamics The single most important change over the past two decades is that the process of internal differentiation within each large caste grouping has now penetrated much deeper. The impact of this process depends on the dimension of differentiation and on the contextual features which allow or prevent sub-groups from crystallizing as distinct entities with an autonomous trajectory; The most common dimensions of differentiation are economic status, livelihood sources, and regional location. The single most important contextual factor that allows or prevents crystallization as an independent entity appears to be region-specific electoral influence. For example, the Yadavs of Uttar Pradesh have not only coalesced as a coherent group, but have also facilitated the emergence of a derivative sub-group called the ‘non-Yadav OBCs’. Individual castes within this latter group, however, are yet to acquire a separate electoral identity.     Similar region-specific developments may be seen in cases such as the Mahars of Maharashtra or the Malas of Andhra Pradesh among the SC groups. But the emergent entity need not be defined as a distinct caste; and it may be an off-stage rather than on-stage actor in the drama of electoral politics. For example, economic differentiation within the upper castes has produced a division into the non-rich, rich and super-rich segments, but these are not sub-castes, and they are not (yet) a separate political constituency and refold. Nevertheless, such groups demand to be addressed politically and are of crucial ideological importance.     The upshot is that caste analysis today has no choice but to be fine-grained and multi-dimensional. This is not just a quantitative change – the crystallization of new political entities triggers qualitative shifts as well, changing the game being played without making it an entirely new game. Moreover, caste being fundamentally relational, it is the changing dynamics between and among caste groupings that matters. From the point of view of the social sciences, what this means is that macro-analysis of caste will become end up either as unhelpful (and unsustainable) generalities, or they will simply become a collection of detailed micro-studies. The sources Thus, the apparent opacity of caste today seems to have two different sources. The first is the exponential increase in the complexity of the field, largely because of the differentiation of the initial groupings that were far too big to remain coherent. It is not that the code of caste has changed but that the caste-text to be read today is far more advanced. In other words, we have not become illiterate with respect to caste but we have to raise our reading skills to a much higher level.     However, it is the second source of opacity that is far more consequential, and this is located not within caste but in its relationship to other contextual factors. The most important of these are neo-liberalism as a hegemonic world-view that re-positioned state and market; the dominance of Hindutva as a political modality; the new media regime that saturates social life; the ongoing restructuring of federalism; and finally, the change in the ecosystem of official statistics.     BIMSTEC after the Colombo summit The question to address now is whether the multilateral grouping is capable of tackling the challenges facing the region RAJIV BHATIA The fifth summit of the regional grouping, the Bay of Bengal initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), held virtually in Colombo on March 30, has undoubtedly advanced the cause of regional cooperation and integration. But a dispassionate look at the grouping, composed of five South Asian countries and two Southeast Asian countries, is needed, especially as it celebrates its 25th anniversary in June this Year. The member-states are: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar and Thailand.     BIMSTEC is no longer a mere initiative or programme. The question to address is whether it is now capable of tackling the challenges facing the region. Representing a fifth of the world’s population that contributes only 4% of the global GDP, can this multilateral grouping trigger accelerated economic development? Colombo package It was clear that BIMSTEC first needed to strengthen itself – by redefining its purpose and rejuvenation its organs and institutions. The much-needed process was launched at the Leaders’ Retreat convened by India in 2016. It gathered momentum, thanks to the outcome of forward-looking summit held in Kathmandu in 2018. The eventual result is now seen in the package of decisions and agreements announced at the latest summit.     The package comprises, first of all, the grouping’s charter. Adopted formally, it presents BIMSTEC as “an inter-governmental organization” with “legal personality.” Defining BIMSTEC purposes, it lists 11 items in the first article Among them is acceleration of “the economic growth and social progress in the Bay of Bengal region”, and promotion of “multidimensional connectivity”. The grouping now views itself not as a sub-regional organization whose destiny is linked with the area around the Bay of Bengal.     The second element is the decision to re-constitute and reduce the number of sectors of cooperation from the unwieldy 14 to a more manageable seven. Each member-state will serve as a lead for a sector: trade, investment and development (Bangladesh); environment and climate change (Bhutan); security, including energy (India); agriculture and food security (Myanmar); people-to-people contacts (Nepal); science, technology and innovation(Sri Lanka), and connectivity (Thailand).     Third, the summit participants adopted the Master Plan for Transport Connectivity applicable for 2018-28. This approval was delayed, but its importance lies in the highest-level political support accorded to this ambitious plan. It was devised and backed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). It lists 264 projects entailing a total investment of $126 billion. Projects worth $55 billion are un implementation. BIMSTEC needs to generate additional funding and push for timely implementation of the projects. Finally, the package also includes three new agreements signed by member states, relating to mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, cooperation between diplomatic academies, and the establishment of a technology transfer facility in Colombo. Trade pillar needs support Post Colombo, a quick look at the unfinished tasks and new challenges gives an idea of the burden of responsibilities on the grouping. The pillar of trade, economic and investment cooperation needs greater strengthening and at a faster pace.     Despite signing a framework agreement for a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2004, BIMSTEC stands far away from this goal. Of the seven constituent agreements needed for the FTA, only two are in place as of now. The general formulations of the Colombo Declaration instill little confidence about prospects of early progress. The need for expansion of connectivity was stressed by one and all, but when it comes to finalizing legal instruments for coastal shipping, road transport and intra-regional energy grid connection, much work remains unfinished. On the positive side, however, there needs to be mention of the speedy success achieved in deepening cooperation in security matters and management of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). As security and economic development are interrelated, it is essential to ensure an equitable balance between the two pillars.     Statements by leaders at the summit gave important clues about the thinking on how to tackle the challenges. The Nepalese Prime Minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba, in a most candid speech emphasized the point that “with less than a decade left, our region is not on track to achieve any of the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030”. He added that the COVID-19 pandemic “has further strained our development effort”. The Thailand Prime Minister (and Defence Minister) Gen. Prayut Chan-o-cha, as the new Chair, expressed his resolve to work for ‘a prosperous, Resilient and Robust, and Open (PRO) BIMSTEC’ during his tenure. As a co-founder and key driver, Thailand can contribute much, provided it marshals sufficient institutional and political resources.     It was left to Prime Minister Narendra Modi to offer an array of practical suggestion to strengthen the grouping. India was the only country to offer additional funding to the Secretariat and also to support the Secretary General’s proposal to establish an Eminent person Group (EPG) for producing a vision document. Other countries need to emulate this sincere matching of words with action.     Governments showed considerable creativity by agreeing to restrict Myanmar’s participation in the summit to the Foreign Minister’s level. This obviated diplomatic controversy. Thailand and India will need to be astute in managing Myanmar’s engagement until the political situation there becomes normal. BIMSTEC should focus more in the future on new areas such as the blue economy, the digital economy, and promotion of exchanges and links among startups and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). Besides, three more suggestions deserve consideration. The personal touch First, the personal engagement of the political leadership should be stepped up. The decision taken in Colombo to host a summit every two years is welcome if implemented. But in the medium term, an annual summit should be the goal, with an informal retreat built into its programme.    Second, BIMSTEC needs greater visibility. India’s turn to host the G20 leaders’ summit in 2023 presents a golden opportunity, which can be leveraged optimally. Perhaps all its members should be invited to the G20 summit as the chair’s special guests.     Finally, the suggestion to simplify the grouping’s name needs urgent attention. The present name running into 12 words should be changed to four words only – the Bay of Bengal Community (BOBC). It will help the institution immensely. Brevity reflects gravitas.